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ABSTRACT
This study investigates the role
the dividend policy
An

asymmetric

of insider ownership in

and the leverage decision

information

model

is

of the firm.

developed

with

the

proportion of equity owned by insiders, dividend payout, and
debt as signals of firm value.
testable

hypotheses that

related to the

on

the

insider

payout and

sectional regression

Analysis of the model yields
ownership is

debt ratio

of a

firm.

analysis of leverage and

insider ownership

is

performed

negatively
Cross-

payout ratio

to test

for

the

hypotheses.
The

hypothesis that

have lower leverage
is

a

joint

test

explanations.

An

firms with

large insider

than firms with small
of

the

signalling

examination of

and

the

holdings

insider holdings
risk

aversion

systematic and

non-

systematic risk across closely and widely held firms is used
to differentiate between the alternative explanations.
The empirical evidence is
that

closely held

firms

consistent with the hypotheses

have

lower leverage

ratios compared to widely held firms.
variables:
number of

CI)

and

payout

Two insider ownership

percentage

of insider

ownership and

(2)

insiders are used

to measure

ownership control.

The percentage of insider ownership is negatively related to
the payout and

leverage while the number of
viii

insiders has a

positive relationship.
time.

These relationships are stable over

The results also indicate

that industry factors are

significant in explaining variations

in payout and leverage

ratios across firms.
A significant
insider ownership

positive relationship is
and the

non-systematic risk

This finding tends to reject

after

than firms

controlling

for

of a

firm.

the risk aversion explanation,

as firms with large non-systematic
shareholdings

observed between

with

size.

risk have higher insider

small non-systematic
The

relationship

insider ownership and systematic risk is negative,

risk,
between

which is

consistent with lower leverage for such firms.
Finally,

the

dividends and
value.

In

study

finds

leverage being

conflicting

"substitute signals"

some industries analyzed,

ratios are positively related while
relationship is negative.
is to provide

evidence

payout

for

of firm

and leverage

in other industries the

The main objective of this study

empirical evidence in the

capital structure area.

ix

divdend policy and

Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Traditional corporate finance has
els in

capital structure

and dividend

generally accepted theory.
have little

policy but

lacks a

Myers (1984) points out that we

understanding of capital

firms choose
Both the

developed several mod

the proportion of

target debt ratio and

structure and

debt or equity

of how

they issue.

the lowest cost

of capital

theories offer unsatisfactory explanations of the cross-section of debt to equity ratios observed in industry.

In div

idend policy, several studies provide evidence that dividend
changes convey information. 1 Black (1976)
supply and
cludes

demand sides

that there

firms set

is no

of the

numerous researchers,

dividend problem

satisfactory

their dividends.

looks at both the
and con

explanation of

Despite subsequent

how

efforts by

dividends continue to remain

a puz

zle. 2

1

Studies that provide empirical evidence include:
Aharony
and Swary (1980),Asquith and Mullins (1983), and Brickley
(1983).

2

A partial list includes Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979),
(1982), Miller and Scholes (1982), Hess (1982), and Eades,
Hess, and Kim (1984).

In

their

(1958),(1961)

landmark

papers,

show that,

assuming

with symmetric information,
pendent of its
sions.

Modigliani

the value

show

cific capital structure exists.
ruptcy

costs also

equilibrium.

of the firm is inde

introduction of taxes and

DeAngelo and Masulis (1980)

produces

Miller

perfect capital markets

capital structure and dividend

With the

and

policy deci

tax subsidies,

that an optimal firm spe
The introduction of bank

an

optimal capital

structure

Altman (1984), provides evidence for signifi

cant bankruptcy costs.

However,

argue that bankruptcy costs

Haugen and Senbet (1978)

associated with liquidation are

not relevant to the capital structure decision.
For

the dividend

(1978) argue that,
used to avoid

policy decision,
with taxes,

Miller and

"home made leverage" can be

paying taxes on dividend

income,

forcing the dividend irrelevance argument.
gliani (1982)

argues that as long

will reduce the value of the firm.

thus rein

However,

Modi

as the tax rate on divi

dend income exceeds that on capital gains,

should not pay any dividends.

Scholes

dividend payouts

This suggests that firms

The issue remains controvei—

sial as Peterson, Peterson, and Ang (1985) estimate that in
dividuals do not shield dividend income from higher taxation
as suggested by Miller and Scholes (1978).

3

Several researchers
formational asymmetry

have suggested agency costs
as determinants

policy and

capital structure. 3

argue that

firms will choose

that minimizes

Jensen and
an optimal

the agency costs

optimal debt ratios
tax benefit

capital structure
An optimal

be achieved by minimiz

and equity.

The existence of

may also be explained

of debt versus

dividend

Meckling (1976)

of the firm.

capital structure equilibrium could
ing the agency costs of debt

of optimal

and in

by balancing the

the increased agency

costs in

curred by the use of leverage.
Rozeff (1982) suggests that an optimal dividend policy is
one obtained by a tradeoff between higher flotation costs of
raising external funds
firm increases

and the reduced agency

dividend payout.

He argues

dividend payouts will be accompanied by

that increased

a need to raise ex

ternal capital to finance the firm's projects.
to receive these funds at

the lowest cost,

disclose information regarding the use
creasing the informational asymmetry
security holders.

costs when a

For the firm

management must

of these funds,

de

between management and

Easterbrook (1984), in a similar manner,

argues that dividends provide a low cost monitoring function
for investors and thus reduce agency costs.

3

A detailed discussion on the
provided in Chapter III.

sources of agency

costs is

With asymmetric information, Ross (1977) and Bhattacharya
(1979)

use similar

approaches to develop models

that show

debt and dividends may be used as signals to reduce informa
tion asymmetry.

More recently,

"substitute signal"
leverage may

Sarig (1985)

hypothesis in which both

be used as

develops the
dividends and

substitute signals of

firm value.

In Sarig and Scott (1985) empirical evidence is presented in
favor of this hypothesis.
relation between dividend

The authors find a positive cor—
yield and leverage for

gate sample of 894 NYSE firms.
no control for the difference

an aggre

However, the study provides
in investment opportunity set

across industries.
Several signalling equilibria models
using leverage

and dividends as

have been developed

signals,

assuming

that a

firm's insidei—managers know more about the value of its as
sets and

investment opportunities than

outside investors. 4

Leland and Pyle (1977) show that the proportion of the equi
ty owned by the insidei—managers is

itself a signal to out

side investors.
The approach adopted in this paper

is similar to the one

suggested by Myers (1984):

4

Ross (1977) and Heinkel (1982) develop equilibria models
using leverage as a signal.
Bhattacharya (1979), Miller
and Rock (1985), and John and Williams (1985) show equi
libria with dividends as a signal.

5

"We should start with a story based on asymmetric infor—
mation and

expand it by

adding only those

elements of

the static tradeoff which have clear empirical support."
In this study, an asymmetric information framework is devel
oped with three signals of firm value:

CI)

the percentage

of equity held by ownei—managers, (2) leverage, and (3)
dividend payout.
determined

the

It is hypothesized that once ownership is

endogenously,

lesser incentive

closely

to signal

held firms

through leverage

will have

a

and dividends

than firms which are widely held, since insider ownership is
itself a signal.

Other motivations such as risk aversion on

the part of insiders as

alternative explanations of the hy

pothesis are considered.

Myers (1984)

firm's informational asymmetry is reduced
issue equity over debt.
for the degree
Majluf (1984)

framework,

in

the Myers and

firms with high insider ownership

(low information asymmetry)

in the present study.

it will prefer to

Since insider ownership is a proxy

of information asymmetry,

capital structures.

suggests that if a

should have low debt

in their

This is consistent with the hypothesis
Since the

issue can be examined em

pirically, a cross-sectional analysis is performed to detej—
mine the

influence of ownership

structure on

and leverage decisions of the firm.

the dividend

6

The main objectives of this study are:
(1) To develop a model in

the asymmetric information frame

work that provides testable hypotheses for the relation
ship between the

proportion of equity held

by insiders

and the dividend and leverage decisions of the firm.
(2) To develop a methodology that

tests the theoretical hy

potheses related to insider ownership.
(3) To provide further empirical evidence on the possibility
of capital

structure and dividend policy

being comple

mentary signals.
A survey of existing theoretical and empirical studies is
presented in

Chapter II.

tailed discussion

This is

followed by a

of the agency and

issues involved in this study.
rived in a multi-dimensional

asymmetric information

An objective function is de

signalling framework,

stable implications are developed.
ership and financial data used

more de

and te

In Chapter IV, the own

in this study are described.

The empirical methodology and construction of variables used
to test the hypotheses that insider ownership has a signifi
cant effect on the firm's dividend policy and capital struc
ture decisions are also included in this chapter.
Chapter V

presents the results

The initial analysis uses analysis

of the

empirical tests.

of variance (ANOVA)

and

non-parametric statistical tests to determine differences in

payout and
firms.

leverage ratios across

closely and

A significant difference is

gate data for payout ratios.

widely held

observed in the aggre

For debt, although the leve?—

age ratios for closely held firms

are lower than for widely

held firms, the difference is not statistically significant.
The results of these tests provide some evidence in favor of
the hypothesis that closely held

firms have lower dividends

and leverage than widely held firms.
Cross-sectional regressions of leverage and payout ratios
on the percentags of insider ownership suggest a significant
negative relationship.

Results of the tests

to determine

whether industry factors affect the firm's leverage and div
idends are consistent with earlier findings of Bradley, Jar—
rell, and Kim (1984)

who show a significant increase in ex

planatory power when industry dummy variables are introduced
in a linear regression model
age.

However,

for the determinants of lever—

there is still a lack of explanatory power,

especially for the leverage results, suggesting that factors
other than ownership, financial characteristics,

and indus

try effects play a role in the determination of leverage and
dividends.
The study provides evidence in favor
erage as a signal of firm value.
leverage for

closely held firms

of the role of lev

The hypothesis that lower
may be

motivated

by risk

8

aversion on the part of ownet—managers is rejected in crosssectional tests o£ ownership with
non-systematic risk.

the firm's systematic and

Empirical findings

gest that ownership is a

of the study sug

significant factor in the determi

nation of debt and dividend decisions of a firm.

Chapter II
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter provides
search in the
The first

a survey of previous

relevant re

asymmetric information and agency

part of the chapter

cost area.

concentrates on a

review of

the theoretical models and the role of signalling in capital
structure and dividend

policy equilibrium of the

discussion of empirical studies in

firm.

A

this area is included in

the latter part of the chapter.
The models

discussed assume an information

capital markets,
regarding the

with insiders

end of

asymmetry in

having superior information

period firm

value.

shows that with asymmetric information,

Akerlof

(1970)

a signalling mecha

nism must exist in order to achieve market equilibrium for a
product.
nancial

The models, however,
variables

used

to

differ in the choice of fi
signal

firm

value

(divi

dend, leverage, and insider ownership) and whether the signal
is costless (non-dissipative)
nalling,

the cost

condition that the

costly.

For costly sig

function must satisfy the

Spence (1973)

marginal cost of signalling

and decreasing with respect to
ue.

or

is positive

the true determinant of val

10

2.1

DIVIDEND POLICY AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
The existing models of asymmetric information in the div

idend

signalling area

These models consider

are

one

dimensional in

dividends as the only

structure.

signal of firm

value but are different in the cost functions used to arrive
at an equilibrium.
Bhattacharya (1979)
model with

develops an

dividend policy as a

asymmetric information

signal of the

flows.

The true distribution of

only to

the insidei—managers.

future cash

these cash flows is known

To

arrive at

a signalling

equilibrium the author considers two costs: (1) the tax dif
ferential between the capital gains

and dividend income tax

and (2) the cost of additional financing needed (if any), to
pay this dividend.

The second cost assumes that a firm will

signal through dividends

even if it has

to raise additonal

funds by issuing new equity.

Miller and Rock (1985)

develop a

model for the value of

the firm under differential information.

The cost of sig

nalling in their study is the loss of funds for real invest
ment due to the increased dividends.
equilibrium,
under dividend
model.

In the Miller and Rock

the firm will have a lower level of investment
signalling than

under the

full information

Among the conclusions for dividend policy,

thors find

that the

payout ratio

should be

the au

an increasing

11

function of the
investors,

proportion of shares held

although no

Analysis of the
hypothesis

empirical

evidence is

model also yields the

that unexpected

by the "outside"

dividend

presented.

empirically testable
and earnings

changes

convey information.
John and Williams (1985)
ing model with
gains.

consider a dissipative signall

differential taxes on dividends

and capital

An equilibrium is established by the balancing of an

increase in

stock price due

to the dividend

signal versus

the loss due to incremental taxes on the dividends.
study the authors

assume that the firm

In the

declares a dividend

only if the demand for cash by the shareholders and the firm
exceeds the supply of cash.

2.2

LEVERAGE AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

Ross (1977),

uses the manager's compensation schedule to

arrive at a signalling equilibrium.

The manager is rewarded

at the end of the period for a correct signal while a penal
ty is imposed if the firm goes bankrupt.
that managers

use leverage

firm's future

earnings.

model is that

firm value will be an

leverage.

to convey

It is hypothesized
information about

The empirical implication

a

of the

increasing function of

12

Heinkel (1982) develops a costless signalling model using
risky debt as a signal of firm value.
for stable

costless equilibrium

A necessary condition

in the

model is

that the

face value of debt is an increasing function of insider own
ership.

Heinkel (1982) derives a one dimensional signalling

equilibrium in which riskier, more valuable firms have larg
er amounts of debt financing.
Myers and Majluf (1984) use asymmetric information to de
rive conclusions regarding the supply
curities in

the capital markets.

The authors

managers with superior information will
of the firm's stock and issue
lued by the market.
market recognizes

of debt or equity se
argue that

know the true value

only stock when it is overva

Otherwise, they will issue debt.

this and views

new stock issues

The

as neg

ative information and discounts the stock price accordingly.
Thus firms forego positive net present value projects if the
net present value of the project being financed is less than
the amount the issue is discounted by investors.
discount is

dependent upon the information

the project's outcome,
information asymmetry is
period of

time,

that period.

asymmetry about

Myers and Majluf suggest that if the
eliminated or reduced for

firms will tend

One testable

is that when firms have

Since the

to only issue

a short

stock over

implication of this observation

a reduced information asymmetry due

to high insider ownership, one should observe a lower level—
age.

13

Recently,

Sarig (1985)

has developed a model

in which

dividends and leverage are substitute signals of firm value.
The model is

based on both dividends and debt

mitment by the firm's management to

being a com

maintain a level of fu

ture cash outlays in the form of dividend payouts and intei—
est payments on debt.
an equilibrium are:

The two costs considered to arrive at

(1) the bankruptcy cost of debt and (2)

the additional cost of financing
dend payments.

required to meet the divi

It is hypothesized that leverage is used by

the firm until the marginal cost of a deviation from the op
timal capital

structure of

the firm

cost of additional dividends.

exceeds the

marginal

The model is similar to that

hypothesized in the present study as it establishes a multi
dimensional signalling equilibrium.

2.3

INSIDER OWNERSHIP AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

Leland and Pyle (1977)
using the

develop a signalling equilibrium

insider's ownership

The authors argue
tion of the

as a

signal of

that a manager retaining

equity of a firm sends a

firm value.

a large propoi—

positive signal about

his expectations of future expected cash flows.

The signal

is costly due to the loss of personal diversification by the
manager.

Downs and Heinkel

(1982)

provide empirical evi

dence in favor of the Leland and Pyle hypothesis by studying
the proportion

of equity

retained by

owners after

a firm

14

goes public.

The authors find that

creasing function

of the proportion

firm value is
of equity

an in

retained at

the time of going public.

2.4

EMPIRICAL STUDIES

Until recently

there has been little

on asymmetric information models.

empirical evidence

Even today, there is lit

tle work that relates ownership, dividends,
signals of firm value.

and leverage as

A majority of the empirical work is

on the influence of information

asymmetry on observed stock

price reaction to new issues of debt and equity.
Rozeff (1982) uses a cross-sectional test, similar to the
present study,

on

a model that relates

dividend payout to

the fraction of equity held by insiders.

The author finds a

significantly negative
sider ownership

relationship between

and dividend payout.

several problems with the study
tigation.

percentage in

However,

there are

that warrant further inves

Some problems with and omissions from the Rozeff

study are presented below:
(1 )

The study did

not control for size of

the firm,

thus

the ownership variable may have been a proxy for size.
(2) The regression variables are estimated by averaging data
over several years. This may introduce a bias in the re
sults.

The payout ratio, for example,

has been aggre
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gated over

six years.

The

present study

uses annual

payouts for dividends thus eliminating any bias.®
(3) The insider ownership data collected from the Value Line
Investment Survey are only approximate data in many cas
es, which may have biased the results. 6
(4) There is no control for variables such as the investment
opportunity set that vary across industries and may sig
nificantly influence

the dividend

decisions of the firm.

This

policy and

leverage

study controls for varia

tions in investment opportunites by employing both intra
and inter industry tests.
(1984)

Bradley,

Jarrell,

and Kim

find a significant industry effect in cross-sec-

tional tests for leverage.
(5) The study

does not control

for the number

and thus does not distinguish between
large percentage

owned by one

of insiders

a firm that has a

insider and a

firm with

many "small" insider shareholders.

5

It is assumed that the one
or steady state value.

6

For a comparison of the Value Line and the Disclosure data
used in this study, see Appendix A. A random sample of 99
firms was chosen for the comparison.
About 30 percent of
the observations from Value Line are significantly diffei—
ent from the Disclosure data,
although the means are not
significantly different.
A similar percent of the data
was stated as approximate in Value Line.
For example the
insider ownership data for Jamesway corporation is given
in Value Line as "about 20 percent".

year payout is the equilibrium
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Several recent

studies examine

security price

reaction

around new security issues.

The evidence presented suggests

that one explanation for the

negative price reaction to new

issues

is the

information asymmetry

outside securityholders.

Mikkelson and

stock price reaction to new issues
vertible debt

to explain

managers and investors.

between managers
Partch (1986)

and
use

of common stock and con

asymmetry of
The authors

information between

find a positive price

effect in the period before announcement

and a two day neg

ative return at the time of the announcement.

This suggests

that managers do indeed time sales of new securites when the
market overprices

them and investors

discount this

at an

nouncement of the new issue.
For offers that were cancelled, the authors find that the
price reaction, after the announcement,
completed offerings.

is opposite that of

Between announcement and cancellation

a significant negative return is observed.
completed offerings,
served,

suggesting

a significant positive return
that managers tend to

that they view as underpriced.
larger negative price
and convertible debt
debt.

Whereas for the
is ob

cancel offerings

In cross-sectional tests a

impact on new issues
is observed as compared

of common stock
with straight
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Asquith and Mullins (1986)

and Masulis and Korwar (1986)

find that negative returns during announcements of stock of
ferings for utilities
als.

are smaller than those

In these studies,

the

for industri

authors hypothesize that this

may be due to the larger information asymmetry for industri
als as compared

with the regulated industry.

Asquith and

Mullins also hypothesize that the negative price reaction to
new issues represents a substantial
ing" to firms that finance

"cost of false signall

dividend signals through new is

sues.
Masulis and Korwar (1986)

also differentiate between of

ferings that involve a decrease in the percentage sharehold
ings of

the management and those

that do not.

They find

that the negative price reaction to an announcement that in
cludes

a

decrease

in insider

holdings

is

significantly

stronger than that for offerings that have no change in pel—
centage of insider
Leland and

holdings.

Pyle (1977)

study that higher insider

This is consistent

model and

the hypothesis

with the
in this

holding reduces information asym

metry.
Eckbo (1986) examines the announcement effect of debt of
ferings.

He finds a negative price impact of debt offering

announcements.

The author thus finds evidence for the asym

metric information

models of

Miller and

Rock (1985)

and
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Myers and Majluf (1984)
tion to new

that predict a negative price reac

issues for both debt and

equity.

Models that

predict leverage to be a positive signal of firm value (Ross
(1977) and Heinkel (1982)) are rejected.
Kim and

Sorensen (1986)

provide empirical

evidence for

the relationship between agency costs and the leverage deci
sion of a firm.
groups:

(1)

In their

those

study,

with an insider ownership

five percent (widely held firms)
sider ownership
Kim and

firms are split into two

of over

25 percent

Sorensen find that

leverage than widely

and (2)

those with an in

(closely held

closely held firms

held firms,

of less than

which is

firms).

have higher

contrary to the

hypotheses and results of this study.
Several potential sources of error that may have distort
ed the results

of the Kim and Sorensen

study are presented

below:
(1)

The division of firms into
and elimination

groups by insider ownership

of firms with percentage

insider hold

ings between 5 and 25 percent is arbitrary and introduc
es a selection

bias in the sample.

insider ownership

is obtained

limited sample of 164 firms
group)

Also

from Value

the data for
Line with

a

(82 firms in each ownership

used for the analysis.

The problems with data

from Value Line are discussed above.
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(2)

For the

regression analysis a one-zero

is used as a proxy for
of the

dummy variable

the insider ownership.

percentage insider ownership,

The use

without deleting

firms in the intermediate group, would eliminate any se
lection bias

and provide a

continous variable

for the

analysis.
(3)

The matching

of firms into pairs

representing closely

held and widely held firms, within an industry,
leting firms that do not

and de

match may have also introduced

a selection bias.
(4) Kim and Sorensen do not control for the number of insid
ers and thus do not distinguish

between a firm that has

a large percentage owned by one

insider and a firm with

many "small" insiders.
The present study

eliminates the above problems

and uses a

comprehensive sample of 1765 firms for the analysis.

2.5

SUMMARY

Information asymmetry
In general,
tion will be

has a wide range

of implications.

the value of the firm under asymmetric informa
less than the value of the

firm under perfect

information.
As.discussed above,
issues

have been

the implications

for pricing of new

empirically investigated

by several

re
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searchers.

The Eckbo (1986)

study

finds evidence for the

asymmetric information models of Miller and Rock (1984)
Myers and Majluf (1985)

and

but rejects the positive signalling

models of leverage by Ross (1977) and Heinkel (1982).
The present study addresses
tion asymmetry for dividend

the implications of informa

payout and leverage equilibrium

of the firm.

A more direct empirical approach of cross-sec

tional tests

is used to

provide evidence for

the positive

signalling models of both dividends and leverage.

Chapter III
MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
In agency literature, the corporation is viewed as a com
plex set of contracts.
restricted to

For

this study,

the discussion is

contracts between managers (agents)

other claimholders of

the firm.

and securityholders are utility

Assuming that

and the

the agents

maximizing individuals with

different self interests and information sets, there will be
a conflict of interest, creating an agency problem.
costs,

as defined

by Jensen and Meckling

curred in the form of:
and (b)

(a)

(1976),

Agency
are in

monitoring and bonding expenses

the loss by the securityholders due to the own wel

fare maximization decisions of the managers.
In order to decrease total

agency costs,

several mecha

nisms have been discussed in financial literature.
tive market mechanisms are discussed

Competi

in Fama (1980).

Fama

suggests that the "threat of takeovers" and managerial labor
markets force managers to act
Another means

of reducing

contractual provisions.

agency costs

is through

Smith and Warner

contractual provisions between
and Smith

in a value maximizing manner.

and Uatts (1984)

(1979)

direct
discuss

stockholders and bondholders
suggest the use

- 21 -
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compensation contracts between

securityholders and managers

to reduce agency problems.
The focus

of this study

reducing agency costs.

is the signalling

mechanism of

For this study, the agency cost and

information asymmetry arguments have been synthesized, since
one of the principal sources of agency costs is information
al asymmetry. 7

3.1

THE MODEL

The purpose of

the model and the analysis is

stable implications for dividend policy,
sider ownership.

and in

The beginning of the period is

is time 0 and the end is time 1.

At time 0, an information

The insidei—managers have superior infor—

mation regarding firm
outside investors.

leverage,

Consider a firm which makes decisions in a

one period planning horizon.

asymmetry exists.

to derive te

value at time 1 as

compared with the

Dividends, leverage, and insider ownei—

ship are costly signals of firm value and at time 0 insidei—
managers make

signalling decisions regarding firm

value at

7 It should be noted that the study is not a complete chai—
acterization of agency cost equilibria.
Other sources of
agency costs not considered in this study are:
(1) the
propensity of the agents to consume excessive perks (see
Jensen and Meckling (1976)); (2) the incentive for the
firm to undertake high risk projects that transfer wealth
from the bondholders to the stockholders (see Barnea et
al. (1985)); and (3) the incentive for managers to forego
positive net present value projects (see Myers (1977)).
Also other agency issues such as agent' compensation are
not discussed.
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time 1.
The outside shareholders form some
of the firm based on the dividend,
signals of the insiders.

estimate of the value

leverage,

The market

and ownership

price of stock at the

end of the period (time 1), is based upon an estimate of fu
ture investment opportunities of the

firm V(D,B,a)

realization of uncertain cash flows,

X,

and the

at the end of the

period.
The probability density function of the cash flows, f(X),
is identical across firms and
the cash flow distributions of

X is a location parameter for
each firm within the economy

such that:

and

f(X> = 0
> 0

for X < X
for X ^ X

The insider's objective function can then be written as:

1
00
Max E(D,B,oc) =
[ V(D,B,a) + J Xf(X)dX D.B.a
1+R
X
D+B
B
J
/3(D+B-X)f(X)dX - J 7(B—X)f(X)dX
B
X
- &(a,A) ]

Subject to B £ 0,

D ^ 0, and

(1 )

0 £ a £ 1.
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where
E

is the time 0 firm value,

D

is the dividend paid at time 1,

B

is the face value of debt due at time 1,

a

is the proportion of equity held by the insiders,

R

is the risk free rate of return,

V

is the value of the investment opportunities
of the firm at time 1,

X

is the cash flow of the firm at time 1,

f(X) is the density function of the cash flows at
time 1,

&

is the cost function of raising additional funds
to finance the firm's projects,

y

is the cost function of raising additional funds
to meet the debt payments,

&

is the cost function imposed on the insiders due
to loss of diversification, and

A

is a measure of the non-systematic risk of the
firm.

The objective function consists
V(D,B,a)

represents

the outsider's estimate of

growth opportunities.
by insiders at

of five different terms.

time 0.

the firm's

This estimate is based on the signal
The next term

represents the sum,

over all states of the world, of the firm's cash flows X.
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The third

term in the expression

is similar to

the one

developed in Bhattacharya (1979) and Eades (1982).

Here, B

represents the cost function imposed on the firm for raising
additional funds (due

to dividend signalling)

in

order to

finance the firm's projects at the end of the planning hori
zon.

This cost becomes large,

especially when the firm's

cash flows are smaller than the

dividends and debt paid out

at the end
reflects the

of the period.

The upper

limit of integration

additional funds necessary

to pay

both divi

dends and debt payments.

It should be noted that it is op

timal for the firm to pay

off debt before any dividends are

paid.
The fourth term in the

objective function represents the

costs of leverage signalling.

These

costs are incurred in

the form of increased bankruptcy costs.
comes large

when the

firm's cash flows

Again, the cost be
are less

than the

face value of debt maturing at the end of the period.
costs may be

incurred in the form of distress

sets to meet the debt payments.
tion that describes the costs
to meet the debt payments.

Here,

These

sales of as

7 is the cost func

associated with raising funds

Since it is optimal for the firm

to pay off their debt before they pay out any dividends, the
limits of integration on the cost of debt term are from X to
B.
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The final term represents the loss of personal diversifi
cation

by insiders

firm's equity

because they

retain a

for signalling purposes.

portion of

Here

the

S represents

the cost function

for the loss of

by the insiders.

These costs may be incurred by the insid

er's,

diversification suffered

to diversify their portfolios or by the firm to raise

additional funds

to diversify.

It

is assumed

that these

costs are not state dependent and are a function of the pel—
centage insider

holdings and the non-systematic

risk meas

ure, A, of the firm.
The primary difference between the objective function de
veloped above and the work of Bhattacharya (1979)
(1982)

and Eades

is that a multi-dimensional model is considered here

with insider ownership,
of firm value.

dividends,

The previous

and leverage as signals

studies consider a one dimen

sional model with dividends as signals.
For the optimal solution of the function (1)

the follow

ing conditions must be satisfied:

dE

dV

dTC

dB

dB

dB

dE

dV

dTC

dD

dD

dD

dE

dV

d£

da

dcx

da

(2A)

(2B)

(2C)
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where TC is the total cost,of signalling.
The explicit

first and second

cost with respect to each of
pendix D.

derivatives of

the total

the signals are derived in Ap

The marginal cost of the signals is positive and

under the

assumptions outlined

in Appendix

D satisfy

the

Spence condition that:

dTC

dTC

dS

,
dB

It can

,
dD

>0

(3)

doc

be shown that

a change

in the marginal

cost of

each signal, holding other costs constant will yield:

dzS

da

d2S

_

/
da2

dA

<

d2S

dB

(4)

d 2 TC

=
dA

0

dadA

/

>

o

(5)

>

o

(6)

dB z

dadA

and
dD
dA

=

d2S
dadA

Equations 4, 5,
D.

Thus

sponse to

/

d 2 TC
dD 2

and 6 are explicitly derived in Appendix

a and B will

move in opposite directions

a change in the

marginal cost of

in re

signalling via
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insider holdings.

Also,

a and D will move in opposite di

rections in response to a similar change.
Since some firms within the economy have more non-systematic risk than others, insiders find it more costly to own a
significant portion of such firms due to higher loss of pei—
sonal diversification.
insider ownership,

The marginal cost of signalling, via

for such firms is higher than others and

thus the equilibrium condition leads
signalling policy.

to a different optimal

To compensate for the

higher marginal

cost of signalling with insider ownership, firms will signal
through either
which

dividends or

leverage.

cross-sectional variations

benefit of the signals is
should be observed.

in the

Thus

for data

in

relative cost

or

important a negative relationship

Formally,

the relationship between a

and B and a and D may be written as:

dB

dD
and

da

<0

(7)

da

This suggests the following hypotheses for leverage and div
idend signalling:
HI:

Widely held firms will have higher leverage
than closely held firms, ceteris paribus.

H2:

Widely held firms will have higher payouts
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than closely held firms, ceteris paribus.
The leverage hypothesis (HI)
test of

signalling and

as

stated above is a joint

risk aversion

hypotheses.

McLean

(1984) argues that ownei—managers, apart from holding equity
in the firm,

have an additional stake,

vested in the firm.
viduals,
of default
structure.

human capital,

in

Thus managers, being risk averse indi

will have an incentive to decrease the probability
and utilize

less debt

in the

firm's financial

An empirical test, later in the study, provides

evidence for the signalling hypothesis

and rejects the risk

aversion hypothesis.
The dividend clientele
cantly contributing
(H2).

to the

effect may be argued
dividend signalling

as signifi
hypothesis

If it is assumed that the owner managers are high tax

bracket individuals,

they may

indeed have little incentive

to pay dividends, since dividends are taxed at a higher rate
than capital gains.
this is not apparent.

However, in a Miller and Scholes world,
This issue has not been addressed in

the present study and may be an interesting issue for future
research.

Chapter IV
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The insider

ownership and

financial data

used in

this

study are primarily obtained from the Disclosure public com
pany information data base.
AMEX,

and OTC

Insider ownership data of NYSE,

firms are included for the

and 1984. 9 Other sources of data
the Compustat Annual Industrial
mation

and the

Center for

fiscal year 1981

used in this study include
tapes for finanacial infoi—

Research

in Securities

Prices

(CRSP) tapes for monthly stock prices.

4.1

THE DISCLOSURE DATA BASE
Use of the Disclosure data base for financial research is

relatively new.

The only other study to use insider ownei—

ship data from the Disclosure tapes is by Lloyd, Jahera, and
Goldstein
data for

9

(1986).

Ownership

and comprehensive

over 4500

firms are

available from

financial

these tapes.

Any bias introduced due to the fiscal year data for finan
cial information and year end data for ownership is inves
tigated by eliminating firms that do not have December as
their fiscal year end.
The results do improve when only
firms with December year end are included in the analysis,
however the difference was not very significant.
The
larger sample is used for the study as it provides a big
enough sample size for the industry analysis.
- 30 -
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The ownership

summary provides

the number

and the percentage of outstanding
classes:

stock owned by four major

(a) investment firms, (b) institutions, (c) 5 pei—

cent owners,
for A.

of shareholders

G.

and (d)

insiders.

Edwards Inc.

is

source of these data is the

A sample ownership record

presented in Table 4.1 .

The

filings by institutions and in

dividuals with the SEC.
Since Disclosure is
tion for research,

a relativley new source

of informa

some of the existing and potential prob

lems with the use of the data are discussed below:
(1)

Unlike Compustat and the CRSP
sure tapes

are not

Missing data

formatted to

are not

data listed.

Thus

data bases,

coded and

the Disclo

facilitate easy
are excluded

each company record has

length which makes the data

use.

from the

a variable

difficult to access without

substantial reformatting.
(2)

The Disclosure
ever,

tapes include about 9500

firms.

How

data frequently are missing and ownership records

for only about 4500 firms are available.
the firms

also have missing

A majority of

sources and uses

of funds

statements.
(3)

Since error rates

have not been compiled

for the Dis

closure tapes, a comparison of results using this infoi—
mation is necessary with results from other sources such
as the Compustat tapes.
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TABLE 4.1
Sample Ownership Record from Disclosure
A. G. Edwards Inc.
Type
Invest Cos
Institutions
5% Owners
Insiders

where Q
M
Change
Held

Date(Q,M)

Owners

12/31/84(0)
12/31/84CQ)
12/3I/84CM)
12/31/84(M)

35
3
101

denotes data that are
denotes data that are
denotes the change in
thousands, and
denotes the number of

Change
0
579
NA
NA

Held

0
2721
1390
2762

%Oun

0.00
20.20
10.32
20.51

revised quarterly,
revised monthly,
number of shares held in
shares held in thousands
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As discussed above, a comprehensive error rate investiga
tion and

substantial reformatting

are required

before the

tapes can be widely used for financial research.

4.2

THE SAMPLE

An initial analysis is performed
of 1765

firms.

Selection

on the aggregate sample

of the

sample for

analysis is

based on the following criteria:
(1) Complete data on financial statements and insider owner—
ship must be available on the Disclosure tapes;
(2) Industry groups

with less than

30 firms have

cluded from the industry analysis.

been ex

The aggregate analy

sis, however, includes all firms with complete data;
(3) Firms with insider
leted from the

ownership of 99.99 percent

sample due to the

were de

possibility of double

counting from filings with the SEC 10
(4) For the dividend analysis,

firms with negative earnings

during the year have been deleted from the sample.
ever,

firms not paying dividends are included,

How

as this

may represent the firm's dividend policy decision.

10

This is based on discussions with a representative of
Computer Directions Advisors, Inc.,
the firm that col
lects the data from SEC filings.
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Financial data for

firms are cross checked

for accuracy

with data from the Compustat annual industrial tapes by com
paring regression results with data from both sources.
ownership data for

a sample of firms is

The

also compared with

the data from the Value Line Investment Survey (see Appendix
A).
In order to control for
ables,

the influence of exogenous vari

such as the investment

opportunity set of the firm,

further analysis is done on an industry basis.
groups are identified by the primary
However,

The industry

SIC code of the firms.

the classification is done on the basis of homoge

neity within the industry rather
digit SIC codes. 11 For a

than two,

complete

three,

or four

discussion of the use of

SIC codes as a means of classifying industry groups see Bowen, Daley, and Huber (1982).

The sample classification for

this paper and the number of

firms within each industry are

presented in Table 4.2 .

total of ten industries,

A

each

with over 30 firms having complete financial data, are iden
tified.

The sample size for

than the

number in

11

Table 4.2

the dividend analysis is less
because firms

with negative

Other means of classification into homogenous groups with
similar investment opportunity sets are considered.
One
proxy used for the investment opportunity set is the
growth in net fixed assets.
The variable is used as a
continous variable and in the dummy form in cross-sec
tional regressions for leverage and payout. In these re
gressions the variable is insignificant in explaining
cross-sectional variations in debt and payout ratios.
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earnings are excluded for this analysis.
industries (eight) are non-regulated.

A majority of the
Two regulated indus

tries, national banks and electric services, are included in
the analysis for comparison of the results with the non-reg
ulated group.
For

the initial

analysis,

firms

within each

industry

group are split into three categories based on the degree of
insider ownership.
are:
(2)

(1)

The three

insider ownership of

groups chosen

for analysis

below 10 percent (group 1),

insider ownership between 10

and 45 percent (group 2),

and (3) insider ownership of over 45 percent (group 3).
primary issue involved here is one

The

of control of the firm. 1 2

Group 1 with an insider ownership of less than 10 percent is
classified as the widely held group.
mediate group,

Group 2 is the intej—

which in some cases may be argued to contain

closely held firms and in other cases widely held firms, de
pending upon the type of firm and its ownership.

Group 3 is

hypothesized to consist of closely held firms.

12

The division of firms into groups by percentage insider
ownership is based on the degree of control exercised by
the insiders on the firm's decisions. Another classifica
tion used is the same as Kim and Sorensen (1986): group 1
(less than five percent insider ownership, group 2 (be
tween 5 and 25 percent insider ownership), and group 3
(above 25 percent insider ownership).
The results for
both these classifications were virtually the same.
How
ever, the former classification was used as it yields a
better distribution of firms among groups.
Unequal group
sizes reduce the power of the overall test for difference
in means.
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TABLE 4.2
Industry Groups in Sample
No of Firms
Aggregate Data

1765

Mining SIC Nos.
Crude Petroleum & Natural Gas 1310,11

125

Manufacturing SIC Nos.
Printing & Publishing 2710 - 2795
Electronic Computing Equipment 3573
Radio and T. V. Communication
Equipment 3662
Measuring and Controlling
Instruments 3820,22,23,24,25,29
Surgical and Medical
Supplies 3840,41,42,43

56
92
67
50
34

Transportation & Public Utilities SIC Nos
Electric Services 4911,31

79

Retail Trade SIC Nos.
Eating & Drinking Places 5810,12,13

39

Finance SIC Nos
National Banks, Fed Members 6025
Services SIC Nos.
Computer Data Processing 7370,72,74,79

108
66
716

The number of firms in this table are obtained after
eliminating firms with incomplete financial information.
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Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to test whether sig
nificant differences exist in the leverage and payout ratios
among the 3 groups.

Since both the payout and leverage rat

ios are non-normal (see Appendix B
results),

the

non parametric Kruskal-Wallis test

The non-normality for
deletion of
proportion

and C for normality test

payout ratios is probably

observations with negative
(33 percent)

of

firms

is used.
due to the

values and

not paying

a large

dividends.

Transformations of the ratios did not eliminate the problem.
Another underlying assumption of ANOVA
in the sample

are independent of each

are split into

other.

groups within industries,

that the independence assumption

is that all firms
Since firms

it

may be argued

is violated within groups.

However, past studies on payout and leverage have shown that
a significant portion of the

variability in these ratios is

due to non-industry factors.

Boquist and Moore (1984) argue

that leverage preferences vary across managers, even if they
are from the same industry.
The overall F
trast that is

test from ANOVA detects at

different from zero,

comparison of means

least one con

therefore,

is necessary to complete

a pairwise

the analysis.

The Tukey-Kramer test is used for the pairwise comparison of
means as

it is

Stoline (1981)).

considered the

best overall

approach (see

38

Finally, cross-sectional regression analysis is performed
using two different

approaches.

sions are performed on the
try separately.
formed on

The first set

aggregate sample and each indus

In the next set,

the aggregate

industry classification.

of regres

the regressions are per—

sample using

dummy variables

The models used for

for

the regres

sions and a discussion of the explanatory variables follow.

4.3

THE LEVERAGE MODEL

The functional form
to be linear,

as in

of the leverage equation
previous studies by Bradley,

is assumed
Jarrell,

and Kim (1984) and Long and Malitz (1983):
S = 3 o + |8i %Insid + j32 Nolnsid +

Stddev +

RAD + <3

jS5 Sales + j36 Depr + e
where
&
/30

13

is the leverage ratio of the firm, 13
is the intercept term.

The leverage ratio is defined as:
long term debt
long term debt+ Market value of equity
This ratio eliminates the problem of inclusion of leases
and convertible debt which may be used to reduce the
agency problem. For a discussion of how convertible debt
may be used to eliminate the agency problem see Jensen
and Meckling (1976).
Also, leases have been shown to be
substitutes for debt (see Ang and Peterson (1984)), and
may as such distort the results.
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%Insid

is the percentage of insider holdings,

Nolnsid

is the natural log of the number of insiders,

Stddev

is the standard deviation of the first
difference in earnings before interest and
taxes (EBIT) over five years,

RAD

is the ratio of research and development
expenditures to total assets,

Sales

is the natural log of the firm's sales
revenue,

Depr

is the ratio of depreciation to total
assets,

0 i , 0z, 03,

0 * , 0s,

and 0 t , are the coefficients of the

corresponding explanatory variables, and
e

is the error term.

Summary statistics of the variables
are presented in Table 4.3 .

used for the regression

TABLE 4.3
Summary Statistics for Leverage Data

Variable

N

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

Ltdebt

1771

0.1944

0.1962

0

0.9985

%Insid

1771

23.7166

23.8802

0

95.9700

Nolnsid

1771

2.2565

0.9445

0

4.6151

Stddev

1765

85.8218

134.6567

RAD

1771

0.0112

0.0311

0

0.2628

Depr

1771

0.0136

0.0264

0

0.1898

0.6070

958.3270
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4.4
4.4.1

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES - LEVERAGE
Insider Ownership

The insider ownership variable is defined as the percent
age of outstanding equity held
esized that insider
firm's leverage.

by insiders. 14 It is hypoth

ownership is negatively related

to the

The variable is available from the owner—

ship summary on the Disclosure tapes.

4.4.2
The

Number of Insiders
number of

insiders is

the other

variable used

measure the concentration of control of the firm.
er the number of insiders,

the

to

The larg

less closely held the firm.

This variable has not been used in earlier studies, since it
has only been available through SEC filings.

Prior studies

have used Value Line data which only reports percent insider
ownership.
The number of insiders provides
measurement of

another dimension for the

the degree of control

of a firm. 1 ®

The hy-

14

An insider is defined by the SEC as any officer, direc
tor, or a 10 percent principal stockholder. Insiders are
required to file form 3 with the SEC within 10 days of
establishing an initial position in any of the firm's
registered securities. Whenever there is a change in the
number of shares held (purchase,
sale, exercise of op
tion, gift, or stock split) the insider must file form 4
within 10 days after the month end following the event
date.

15

The issue of large blocks of stocks controlled by insid
ers that do not get along with each other as compared
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pothesized sign on this variable is positive.

The data are

available directly from the ownership summary on the Disclo
sure tapes.

4.4.3

Standard Deviation of EBIT

Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984) show that the variabili
ty in a firm's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT)
an important determinant of leverage.
ability in EBIT,
the lower the

the higher

leverage.

ing and financial

Also higher EBIT

risky debt does

risk firm.

related as

a lower capacity for fi

However, Myers (1977) suggests a positive re
leverage and business risk.

firm with high business

value to the

the variability in sales

leverage should be negatively

lationship between
that a

variability im

Traditional finance assumes that operat

firms with high business risk have
nancial risk.

The greater the vari

the probability of default and

plies higher operating leverage if
is held constant.

is

risk will borrow

not negatively influence the

same extent that it influences

He argues
more,

as

firm's market
a low business

The variable (stddev) is estimated by calculat

ing the standard

deviation of the first

over the past five years.

difference in EBIT

The hypothesized relationship be

tween leverage and variability in EBIT is positive.

with several "small" insiders voting
dressed in the study.

together is not ad
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4.4.4

Research and Development Expense

Long and Malitz (1983) hypothesize that the firm's intan
gible

investment opportunities

Their argument is that
tor the intangible
ments in R&D.

investments of the firm

capacity.

such as invest

Firms also usually will not divulge their R&D
important information to competi

Since the bondholders are

investments,

its debt

bondholders cannot effectively moni

plans as this may provide
tors.

reduce

not able to monitor these

there is an incentive on

the part of the cui—

rent owner—managers to undertake risky projects resulting in
a wealth transfer from the
This follows from

bondholders to the stockholders.

the argument that equity

as a call option on the firm.

may be modelled

The stockholders may, at the

maturity of the debt, buy back the firm from the bondholders
or default.

It is also well known that the value of a call

option is an increasing function of risk.
incentive on

the part

of stockholders

Thus there is an

to undertake

risky

projects.
Bondholders realize

this and in a

rational expectations

model demand higher interest on the debt of firms with large
intangible investments, thereby reducing the firm's debt ca
pacity.
negative.

Thus the hypothesized sign for the R&D variable is
The variable is estimated as

penses to total assets.

a ratio of R&D ex
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4.4.5

Sales Revenue

Sales revenue is used as a proxy for firm size and is in
cluded in the set of regressors to control for any "size ef
fect".

Studies

by Ferri and

Jones (1979)

and

Flath and

Knoeber (1980) argue that larger firms have more debt capac
ity and are able to issue debt at a lower cost when compared
to smaller

firms.

Since larger

closely followed by analysts and

firms are

typically more

investors,

size is an im

portant consideration as smaller firms should have a greater
information asymmetry than larger firms.

Arbel (1985) finds

that firms that are not closely followed by analysts outpei—
form firms that

are closely followed.

He

attributes this

"neglected firm effect" to the difference in information as
ymmetry between firms.
correlation between

However, one would expect a negative

firm size

and insider

ownership;

the

smaller the firm, the more closely held it is likely to be.

4.4.6

Depreciation

This variable provides an estimate of the firm's tangible
asset base.

It eliminates assets that may be non-producing

or obsolete,

essentially eliminating assets that

ready been depreciated.

Since a

have al

majority of the firms use

straight line depreciation for financial reporting purposes,
variations due

to different depreciation practices

for tax
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purposes are eliminated.
and Malitz (1983)
will have a

Myers C1977) and subsequently Long

argue that firms with a larger asset base

greater capacity to support

debt,

since fixed

assets are relatively easy to monitor and provide collateral
for bondholders.

The hypothesized

variable is positive.

A similar

ley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984).

sign on the depreciaton
variable is used in Brad

The variable is standardized

by taking a ratio of depreciation expense to total assets.
A summary

of the explanatory

esized relationship

between the

variables and

the hypoth

explanatory variables

the leverage ratio is presented in Table 4.4 .

and
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TABLE 4.4
Hypothesized Signs of the Explanatory Variables:
Dependent Variable - Leverage Ratio
Explanatory Variable

Hypothesized Sign

Variable Name

Percentage of insider
ownership

%Insid

Natural logarithm of the
number of insiders

Nolnsid

Standard deviation of the
first difference in
earnings before interest
and taxes over the past
five years

Stddev

Ratio of research &
development expenses to
total assets
Natural logarithm of sales
revenue
Ratio of depreciation
expense to total assets

RAD
Sales

Depr
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4.5

THE DIVIDEND MODEL

The dividend payout model is
oped by Rozeff (1982).

similar to the model devel

The regression model to be estimated

is of the form:
P

= fio + 8i %Insid + 02 Noinsid + 0 3 DOL + $4 DFL +
/3s Sgroth + 0 6 Sales + e

where
P

is the payout ratio of the firm,

00

is the intercept term,

%Insid

is the percentage of insider holdings,

Noinsid

is the

natural log of the

number of insid

ers,
DOL

is the degree of operating leverage of the
firm,

DFL

is the degree of financial leverage of the
firm,

Sgroth

is the geometric mean of the percentage
sales growth over the past five years,

Sales

is the natural log of the firm's sales
revenue,

16

The payout ratio is defined as
share to earnings per share.
are excluded.

the ratio of dividends per
Preferred stock dividends
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3i, j3z, /33, j3/>. 05. and /36 are the coefficients of the
corresponding independent variables, and
e

is the error term.

Results of this study,

however,

will be stronger than the

Rozeff study since:
(1)

An additional explanatory

variable has been introduced

to control for size.
(2)

The investment

opportunity set has been

controlled by

conducting the analysis on an industry basis.
(3)

Any

distortion introduced by

averaging the

data over

several years has been eliminated.
(4)

An additional variable,

added to

number

distinguish between firms

centage owned by one individual

of insiders,
that have a

has been
large per—

as compared to the percent

age owned by several individuals.
(5)

Disclosure data is used,

mate ownership

which eliminates any approxi

data and provides

a larger sample

size for

analysis.
Summary statistics of the data used in the regression are
presented in Table 4.5.
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TABLE 4.5
Summary Statistics for Payout Data

Variable

N

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

Payout

1771

0.2598

0.2515

0

0.9893

%Insid

1771

23.7166

23.8802

0

95.9700

Nolnsid

1771

2.2565

0.9445

0

4.6151

Sales

1771

19.0663

1.9365

6.4599

26.7544

DOL

1770

7.3416

15.5195

0.0930

166.1400

DFL

1771

1.4530

1.5821

-15.1221

27.8500

Sgroth

1725

22.8829

33.3290

-24.5999

237.1999
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4.6

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES - PAYOUT

The agency variables
in the leverage model.
between

used in this model are

the same as

Again, the hypothesized relationship

payout and insider ownership

is negative.

On the

other hand, the hypothesized relationship between the number
of insiders and

the payout ratio is

positive.

sales revenue is included to control

The firm's

for the firm "size ef

fect".

4.6.1

Degree of Operating Leverage

The degree of operating leverage
a negative

is hypothesized to have

relationship with payout ratio.

Rozeff (1982)

argues that the higher a firm's operating leverage, the more
the firm will reduce payout to
other things being equal.

lower the cost of financing,

The DOL is estimated using:

% A EBIT
DOL =

2 |

|

/

N

% A Sales

The absolute value of the past five years data is used since
it is the magnitude of the
not the

direction (see

volatility that is important and

Reilly (1985)).

sign for this variable is negative.

The hypothesized
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4.6.2

Degree of Financial Leverage

The degree of financial leverage

is also hypothesized to

have a negative relationship with the payout ratio.
operating leverage,
the more

the higher a firm's financial leverage,

the firm will reduce

financing,

As with

payout to lower its

other things being equal.

cost of

The DFL is estimated

using:

EBIT
DFL =
EBIT - I

where:
EBIT
I

4.6.3
The

is the earnings before interest and taxes, and
is the interest expense.

Sales Growth
firm's sales

growth opportunities.

growth

provides

an estimate

The geometric mean

of

its

of the past five

years' sales growth is used as a proxy for the sales growth.
Typically,

firms that have larger growth opportunities have

a greater need for internal funds and thus pay out a smaller
proportion of their earnings.
A summary

of the explanatory

esized relationships

variables and

between the explanatory

payout are presented in Table 4.6 .

the hypoth

variables and
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TABLE 4.6
Hypothesized Signs of the Explanatory Variables:
Dependent Variable - Payout Ratio
Explanatory Variable

Hypothesized Sign

Variable Name

Percentage of insider
ownership

JJInsid

Natural logarithm of the
number of insiders

Nolnsid

Degree of operating
leverage

DOL

Degree of financial
leverage

DFL

Natural logarithm of sales
revenue

Sales

Geometric mean of the
five year sales growth

Sgroth

Chapter V
RESULTS

5.1

INSIDER OWNERSHIP AND DIVIDENDS

5.1.1

Group Analysis

Tests for the normality of the payout ratios are done be
fore the

analysis of

variance (ANOVA)

procedure is

pet—

formed.

The skewness, kurtosis, and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov

D statistic indicate non-normality for the aggregate data as
well as for the individual groups.
are reported in
kurtosis for

The results of the tests

Table IB in Appendix B.

the the

closely held

largest of the three groups.

The skewness and

group (group3)

is the

This is due to the fact that a

large proportion of the closely

held firms (52 percent)

do

not pay dividends, as compared with 22 percent for the widely held firms Cgroupl).
The payout ratios are transformed using several different
approaches.

The results

of the natural logarithm

and the

square root transformations are reported in Table IB.
the transformations

did not significantly improve

mality, it is preferable to use

Since

the nor—

the non parametric Kruskal-

Wallis test.

- 53 -
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The results

of the group

presented in Table 5.1 .

analysis for payout

Both

ratio are

the ANOVA and the non-para

metric Kruskal- Wallis test results show significance at the
5 percent

level for the aggregate

the eight

industries.

data as well as

Thus non-normality,

in

four of

this case,

does not alter the results substantially.
The Tukey-Kramer test results reported
comparison of means.
the table,

Each pair of groups

with significant differences

an asterisk.
ference in

are for the pairwise
is presented in

in pairs marked by

As expected, these results also detect a dif
means in

Kruskal-Wallis tests.

the same industries

ANOVA and

Industries in which payout ratios are

not significant have a large disparity
servations across

as the

groups,

power of the overall test.

in the number of ob

resulting in

a decrease

By casual observation,

in the
all in

dustries except Computer Data Processing,

had lower payouts

for the closely

compared with the

held group (group 3)

widely held group (group 1).

as
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TABLE 5.1
Results of the Group Analysis - Payout Ratio

Industry

Aggregate Data
Crude Petroleum
& Natural Gas
Printing and
Publishing
Electronic
Computing Equip.

Radio & TV
Equipment
Measuring &
Control Instr.
Eating & Drinking
Places

National Banks
Computer Data
Processing

Group

N

Group
Mean
Payout

Overall
F ANOVA

ChiSq
TukeyKruskal Kramer
Uallis Test

1
2
3

719
706
346

0.3499
0.2262
0.1411

101.19
<.001)

183.20
(.001)

1-2*
1-3*
2-3*

1
2
3

21
22
21

0.3632
0.1593
0.1589

3.69
(.031)

6.67
(.036)

1-2*
1-3*
2-3

1
2
3

13
20
15

0.2405
0.3349
0.1627

6.01
(.005)

8.78
(.012)

1-2
1-3
2-3*

1
2
3

12
29
17

0.1497
0.0103
0.0147

8.10
10.98
(.001) (.004)

1-2*
1-3*
2-3

1
2
3

15
17
16

0.2658
0.1031
0.0553

4.98
(.011)

8.87
(.012)

1-2*
1-3*
2-3

1
2
3

4
18
9

0.1459
0.1299
0.1195

.02
(.956)

0.24
(.889)

1-2
1-3
2-3

1
2
3

1
20
12

0.0000
0.1339
0.0737

1 .31
(.185)

2.78
(.249)

1-2
1-3
2-3

1
2
3

57
29
9

0.3613
0.3437
0.3011

0.69
(.311)

0.86
(.649)

1-2
1-3
2-3

1
2
3

7
26
17

0.0340
0.0360
0.1100

1 .62
(.265)

2.25
(.279)

1-2
1-3
2-3

* significant at the 10 percent level
Group 1: below 10 percent insider ownership
Group 2: between 10 and 45 percent insider ownership
Group 3: above 45 percent insider ownership
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5.1.2

Regression Analysis

In order to

detect if the dependent

variable is related

to the independent variables, a correlation analysis is pei—
formed.

This analysis

detect potential

multi-

col linearity problems among the dependent variables.

Table

5.2 shows

also helps

the correlation

variables.

Several

matrix for

of the

explanatory variables

significant multicollinearity,
increased

sensitivity of

sample size increases.
with %Insid, Nolnsid,

the dividend

exhibit

as expected because

the correlation

payout

of the

analysis as

the

However, sales are highly correlated
and Sgroth.

Multi-collinearity does

not, in general, influence the ability to obtain a good fit;
it may however alter either the
the coefficients of the
is to run
reducing

sign or the significance of

explanatory variables.

the regressions without the
the standard

coefficients of

errors of

correlated variable,

the estimated

the independent variables.

omitted for the initial set of regressions.
sis

done with

shows that

sales included

as

multicollinearity does

One remedy

regression

Thus

sales is

Further analy

an explanatory

variable

not significantly

alter

the regressions.
All the signs in the

correlation matrix are as predicted

although DFL is not significant.

As expected the number of

insiders is positively correlated with the percentage of in-
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TABLE 5.2
Correlation Matrix: Dependent Variable- Payout Ratio
(P Values in Parentheses)
1725 Firms
Payout

%Insid

Nolnsid

Sale

DOL

DFL

Sgroth

Payout 1.0000 -0.3057 0.3184
(0.000) (.0001) (.0001)

0.5216 -.1407
(.0001) ( .0001)

1.0000 0.0462
(0.000) (.0519)

-0.2814 .0618
(.0001) ( .0093)

.0834

1.0000

0.5141 .0886
(.0001) ( .0002)

.0686 -0.1270

1.0000 —.1202
(.0000) ( .0001)

.0485 -0.2149

%Insid
Nolnsid

(.000)
Sale
DOL

—

1 .0000
( .000)

DFL

0.1151

.0434 -0.1058
(.0677) (.0001)

1.0000

0.0186

(.0000) (.4395)
Sgroth

1.0000
(.0000)
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sider ownership variable.

The DFL and DOL variables are po

sitively correlated, providing evidence for the Myers (1977)
hypothesis that the value of a
is affected

to a

firm with high business risk

lesser degree by

with a firm that has small

risky debt

business risk.

high business risk may use more

as compared

Thus firms with

risky debt in their capital

structures.
The results of the least

squares regression using payout

as the dependent variable are presented in Table 5.3 .
residuals from

the regression

and non-normality.

used.

for independence

Results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test

are presented in Table 1B in
mate test for

are tested

The

Appendix B.

normality by Snedecor and

Also an approxi
Cochran (1980)

is

The test statistics are:

<*3

«4

>/ 6 / N
«>/ 24 / N
where:
a 3 is the skewness of the distribution,
a*, is the kurtosis of the distribution, and
N is the number of observations.

These

statistics have

The results of
als.

standard normal

distribution.

the tests indicate non-normality

of residu

Several transformations of the dependent variables are

used to obtain normality.
rithm

a

and square

root

The results for the natural loga

transformations

are in

Table

IB.
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While the natural logarithm transformation improves kurtosis
it increases the skewness.
gives the

best results

The Kolmogorov-Smirnov

The square root transformation

with lower

skewness and

D statistic with

kurtosis.

the transformation

improves from 0.08 to 0.03.
To test for independence of the residuals the Durbin-Watson test

for first degree

auto-correlation is

used.

The

Durbin-Watson D is 1.88 with a first degree auto-correlation
of 0.06,
residuals

implying

independent error terms.

versus the

independent

The

variables and

plots of
predicted

values are presented in Figures IB to 7B in Appendix B.

The

plots appear to imply homoscedasticity.
The transformation of the
an increase in

dependent variable resulted in

the R square value from 0.30

significance of

both the JSInsid

and the

to 0.37.

The

Nolnsid variables

also improved.
The regression

for the the aggregate

the evidence in the correlation analysis.
nificant multicollinearity does exist

data substantiates
Even though sig

between sales and the

other variables, the results are as hypothesized.
on all

the variables

are as

coefficient is not significaint.

predicted,

although

The signs
the DFL
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The R square and F values

for the aggregate analysis are

0.37 and 167.19 respectively.
bly with the Rozeff (1982)
and an F

value of 185.47.

These values compare favora

results with an R square of 0.48
Both the

significant at the .001 level and
ed.

This provides

insider variables are

the signs are as predict

further evidence for the

this study that payout and

hypothesis of

insider ownership are negatively

related.
In each of the industry

groups except computer data pro

cessing and electric services, the percentage of equity held
by

insiders is

negatively

related

to the

though not significantly in all cases.
ers is positively

payout

ratio,

The number of insid

related to the payout in

all nine indus

tries.
In the electric services
are contrary
tries.

to those

for a majority

This is consistent

hypothesis.

(utility)

industry the results
of the

other indus

with the asymmetric information

Smith (1986), hypothesizes that the regulation

process in the utility industry

reduces the information as

ymmetry between managers and outside securityholders.

Also

by paying high dividends, utilities frequently have to raise
external funds through capital markets.
an effective monitoring
ers.

This process allows

by capital markets and

the outsid

In such a case the relationship between insider owner—
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ship

and dividends

under

asymmetric

information will

no

longer exist since the difference in information is small.
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TABLE 5.3
Results of the Least Squares Regression:
Dependent Variable Payout Ratio - 1984
(T Statistics and P Values in Parenthesis)
(-)

Industry

N

( +)

Constant SInsid Nolnsid

<-)

(-)

DOL

DFL

(-)

Sgroth

(+)
Sales

R
Square

Aggregate
Data
1725 -0.631 -.002
.033
-.002 -.002
-0.002
.057 0.37
(-8.62) (-8.59) (4.21) (-5.71)(-0.52)(-12.70)(14.18)
(.001)

Crude Pet.
& Nat Gas
Printing &
Publishing

61
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(.001) (.001)

(.001) (.601) (.001)

(.001)

0.39

0.684 -.003
.010 -.002
-.147
0.002
(4.93) (-3.16) (0.28) (-0.88) (-3.71) (1. 15)
(.001) (.003) (.785) (.383) (.001) (.257)

0.35

.036 -.018
-.051 -0.001
(0.71) (-1.21) (-0.33)(-1.24)
(.484) (.232) (.743) (.222)

0.15

0.037 -.016
.614 -0.003
(0.46) (-0.91) (2.31) (-1.46)
(.649) (.372) (.029) (0.157)

0.11

.034 - 0 . 0 0 1
( 0 . 1 2 ) (-0.36)
(.903) (.727)

0.39

0.054 -.292
-.268
0.001
(2.32) (-3.19)(-2.36) (-0.03)
(.028) ( . 0 0 2 ) ( . 0 2 1 ) (.969)

0.18

0 . 1 2 8 -.006
.051 - 0 . 0 0 1
(3.10) (-0.67) (1.27) (-1.59)
(.004) (.509) (.215) (.123)

0.26

0.026
.023
(1.26) (1.46)
(.209) (.147)

0.31

0.047
.009
-.002
0.001
(1.00) (1.05) (-0.06) (0.62)
(.324) (.301) (.955) (.538)

5.98

(.001)
0.24

.057
(5.52)
(.001)

8.47

(.001)

0 . 1 1 8 -.044
.128 - 0 . 0 0 1
(3.45) (-1.31) (1.18) (-0.71)
(.001) (.198) (.243) (.482)

0.209
.019
(2.74) ( 1 . 2 6 )
(.015) (.228)

167.19
(.001)

0.031 -.004
.158
.089
-.040 - 0 . 0 0 1
(0.17) (-3.17) (4.50) (0.87) (-1.50) (-2.43)
(.865) ( . 0 0 2 ) ( . 0 0 1 ) (.385) (.139) ( . 0 1 8 )

Elect. Comp.
Equipment
51 -0.194 - . 0 0 1
(-1.23) (-1.66)
( . 2 2 6 ) (.104)
Radio & TV
Equipment
46 0.416 -.004
( 1 . 8 2 ) (-3.09)
(.076) (.004)
Measuring &
Cntrl Inst 30 -0.432 -.001
( - 1 . 2 8 ) (-0.16)
(.214) (.874)
Surgical &
Medical Sup 21 -0.306 -.003
( - 1 . 0 6 ) (-1.62)
(.308) (.126)
Electric
Services
90 1.503
.001
(6.23) (0.02)
( . 0 0 1 ) (.983)
Eating & Drinking
Places
33 -0.009 - . 0 0 1
(-0.07) (-0.96)
(.942) (.347)
National
Banks
95 0.307 - . 0 0 2
(3.76) (-3.61)
( . 0 0 1 ) (.001)
Comp. Data
Processing 49 -0.113
.002
(-0.86) (1.58)
(.394) (.120)

F
Value

4.22
(.003)
2.60
(.039)
1.76
(.159)
3.51
(.027)
4.79
(.001)
3.24
(.020)
11.95

(.001)
0.01

0.89
(.494)
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5.2

INSIDER OWNERSHIP AND LEVERAGE

5.2.1

Group Analysis

Tests for the normality
the ANOVA group analysis.

assumptions are performed before
The skewness, kurtosis,

and the

Kolmogorov-Smirnov D test statistic are reported in Table 1C
in Appendix

C.

The

test results

indicate non-normality.

Different transformations are attempted to obtain normality.
The square root transformation does

improve the Kolmogorov-

Smirnov

eliminate the

D statistic

Thus the

but fails

to

non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis

test is

problem.
preferable

for these data.

The results of

the group analysis for

sented in Table 5.4 .

leverage are pre

For the aggregate data both the ANOVA

and the

Kruskal-Wallis tests detect

means.

The

Tukey-Kramer test

a difference

results show

in group

a significant

difference in the means of leverage ratios between the wide
ly held group
3).

(group 1)

and the closely

held group (group

This provides evidence for the hypothesis of this study

that there

exists a negative relationship

and insider ownership.

between leverage

The electrical services industry is

excluded from this analysis as it does not have any firms in
the closely held group (group1).

TABLE 5.4
Results of the Group Analysis - Leverage Ratio

Industry

roup

N

Group

Overall

Mean

F AN0VA

Leverage

Aggregate Data
Crude Petroleum
& Natural Gas
Printing and
Publishing
Electronic
Computing Equip.
Radio a TV
Equipment
Measuring &
Control Instr.
Surgical &
Med Supplies
Eating & Drinking
Places

National Banks
Computer Data
Processing

1
2
3

719
706
346

1
2
3

37
43
45

1
2
3

16
26
14

1
2
3

27
46
19

1
2
3

20
28
19

1
2
3

8
25
17

1
2
3

6
21
7

1
2
3

3
25
11

1
2
3

60
37
11

1
2
3

14
32
20

0.,2204
0., 1667
0., 1966
0..2684
0..4282
0..2940
0..2025
0..0815
0.. 1903
0.,2105
0..0582
0..0880
0., 1245
0., 1059
0..0795
0.,0636
0.. 1002
0..1052
0.. 1570
0.. 1652

ChiSq

Kruakal Kramer
Hallis

Test

28.53
(.001)

1-2"
1-3
2-3"

2.33
(.101)

5.48
(.065)

1-2
1-3
2-3

4.63
(.014)

7.03
(.030)

1—2"
1-3
2-3

6. 16
(.003)

1 1.34
(.013)

1-2"
1-3"
2-3

0.25
(.776)

0.46
(.796)

1-2
1-3
2-3

0. 16
(.851)

1.20
(.904)

1-2
1-3
2-3

0.09
(.918)

0.49
(.781)

1-2
1-3
2-3

1 .63
(.209)

3.04
(.218)

1-2
1-3
2-3

4.45
(.014)

8.57
(.014)

1-2"
1-3
2-3»

1 .28
(.285)

3.78
(.151)

1-2
1-3
2-3

13.38
(.001)

0..1310

0..0543
0..2164
0,.2421
0.. 1984
0,. 1 105
0.,2386
0..0952
0,, 1512
0.,0782

Tukey-

• significant at the 10 percent level
Group 1: below 10 percent insider ownership
Group 2: between 10 and 45 percent insider ownership
Group 3: above 45 percent insider ownership

65

In the industry
tries

have a

analysis,

greater

though six of

leverage for

group

firms) than group 3 (closely held firms),
significant in only one group.
results are significant,

Thus,

the ten indus
1 (widely

held

the difference is

though the aggregate

the results of the industry analy

sis are not as good as the group analysis for dividends.

5.2.2

Regression Analysis

Initially,

a correlation analysis is

done to detect po

tential multi-collinearity problems and also to determine if
a significant relationship exists
the independent variables.

between the dependent and

Table 5.5 shows the correlation

matrix between leverage ratio and the explanatory variables.
Again sales are highly correlated with the %Insid,
and Stddev.

Since the multi-collinearity may influence ei

ther the sign

or the interpretation of

the explanatory variables,
gression.

Nolnsid,

the coefficients of

sales is not included in the re

All the signs except Stddev are as predicted and

each is significant at the .01 level.

Table 5.6
leverage.

presents the

least squares

regression for

The residuals from the regression are tested for

independence and non-normality.

Results

from the Kolmogo-

rov-Smirnov normality test are given in Table 1C in Appendix
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TABLE 5.5
Correlation Matrix: Dependent Variable- Leverage Ratio
(P Values in Parentheses)
1765 Firms
Ltdebt

%Insid

Nolnsid

Sale

Stddev

RAD

Depr

Ltdebt 1.0000 -0.0677 0.1124
(0.000) (.0043) (.0065)

0.2810 -.0027 -.1750 0.2199
(.0001) (.9099) (.0001) (.0001)

%Insid

1.0000
0.0462
(0.000) (.0519)

-0.2895 . 1 161
.0338 -0.0354
(.0001) (.0001) (.1551) (.1360)

1.0000
(.000)

0.5141 -.1829
.0516 -0.0146
(.0001) (.0001) (.0300) (.5381)

Nolnsid
Sale
Stddev
RAD
Depr

1.0000 -.3074 -.1407 0.0741
(.0000) (.0001) (.0001) (.0030)
1.0000
(.000)

.0946-0.0463
(.0001) (.0516)
1.0000 -0.0608
(.0000) (.0105)

1.0000
(.0000)
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C.

The approximate test by Snedecor and Cochran (1980)

de

scribed in the dividend analysis section is also used to de
tect non-normality.

These test results indicate non-normal

ity of

Among

residuals.

square root

the several

tempted,

the

reducing

the Kolmogorov-Smirnov

transformations at

transformation worked
D statistic

the best,

from 0.10

to

0.04.
The Durbin-Watson D for the auto-correlation is 1.96 with
a first degree auto-correlation
dent error terms.

The plots

of 0.02,

implying indepen

of residuals versus the inde

pendent variables and predicted values are presented in Fig
ures 1C

to 6C in

Appendix C.

The plots appear

to imply

constant variance of error terms.
The transformation of the leverage

ratios resulted in an

increase in the R square value from 0.08 to 0.10.
nificance of the insider variables also improved.

The sig

TABLE 5.6
Results of the Least Squares Regression:
Dependent Variable Leverage Ratio - 1984
(T Statistics and P Values in Parenthesis)
(-)

Industry

N

Aggregate
Data
1765

Crude Pet.
& Nat Gas 125
Printing S
Publishing

55

Elect. Coop.
Equipment
92

SInsid

Nolnsid

0.283
(17.27)
(.001)

-.001
(-2.91)
(.003)

.036
(5.911)
(.001)

0.294
(5.23)
(.001)
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0.001
(0.20)
(.846)

0.301
(3.85)

-.002

0.211

(2.69)
(.009)
Measuring &
Cntrl Inst 50

-.001

(-1.71)
(.090)

0.361
(4.82)
(.001)

(.001)
Radio S TV
Equipment

( +)

Constant

(-2.52)
(.014)
-.001

(-1.50)
(.138)

0.054
-.001
(0.55) (-0.49)
(.581)
(.630)
Surgical & Medical
Supplies
34 0.316
-.001
(1.91) (-0.49)
(.066)
(.628)
Electric
Services
79 0.440
.001
(4.72)
(0.01)
(.001)
(0.99)
Eating a Drinking
Places
39 0.155
.001
(I.67)
(1.29)
(.205)
(.104)
National
Banks
108 0.259 - . 0 0 1
(2.99) (-0.58)
(.003)
(.563)
Comp. Data
Processing 66 0. 143
-.001
(1.55) (-0.52)
(.125)
(.607)

.094
(4.06)
(.001)

(+)

(-)

( +)

Stddev

RAD

Depr

.001
(2.40)
(.016)

-.001
(-1.04)
(.299)

-1.373
(-7.52)
(.001)

-.773

R
Square

F
Value

1.988
(9.32)
(.001)

0.10

37.50

0. 188

0.27

(.001)

(.100)

(.001)

(.001)

-.041
(-1.47)
(.149)

.001
(1.28)
(.207)

-3.943
(-1.91)
(.063)

2.061
(2.60)
(.012)

0.22

0.002

.001

0.689
(1.95)
(.054)

0.11

(0.09)
(.929)

-. 127
(-0.36)
(.721)

0.032
-.001
(0.98) (-0.97)
(.329) (.337)

.124
(1.14)
(.257)

0.795
(0.63)
(.531)

0.07

.001
(0.04)
(.966)

-.569 23.023
(-1.19) (0.90)
(.241) (.373)

0.15

0.084
-.001
(1.31) (-1.11)
(.199) (.278)

-2.607 -3.435
(-2.69) (-0.58)
( . 0 1 2 ) (.568)

0.28

(0.08)
(.937)

0.119
(2.74)
(.009)

0.029
(1.18)
(.239)

.004
(1.57)
(.120)

0.071
(1.99)
(.054)

.001
(0.27)
(.782)

0.036
(1.13)
(.262)

.001
(1.31)
(.192)

0.070
-.001
(1.95) (-0.14)
(.056) (.893)

10.24

(-1.66) (5.06)

18.63
(0.74)
(.459)

1.201

(.004)
2.08
(.075)
0.94
(.458)
1.60
(.181)

2.21
(.082)

0.10

(2.43)
(.017)
1 .252

3.96

1.70
(.144)

0.16

(1.80)
(.080)

2.81

(.041)

0.02

1.02
(.391)

-.449
(-1.13)
(.262)

0.279
(0.66)
(.510)

0.09

.1.23
(.305)
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The results of the aggregate data support the group anal
ysis results.

For the aggregate

data,

the signs

of the

variables are as predicted and significant at the .01 level.
This provides

further evidence

leverage are negatively related.
regression is low,
cance.

ownership and

Though the R square of the

the overall F value

indicates signifi

The low R square implies that factors other than the

financial factors
study are also
age.

that insider

and insider ownership considered

important determinants of the

Later in the chapter,

fects is

investigated.

studies is not uncommon.

in this

firm's level—

the influence of industry ef

A low

R square value

in leverage

Kim and Sorensen (1986) report an

R square of 0.15 in their regression analysis.
In the industry analysis,

the percentage of insider own

ership has a negative coefficient in seven of the ten indus
tries, though not always significant.

Other variables also

show similar consistency, though not all are significant.
It is possible that the results for the leverage analysis
are biased due

to the fact that for

smaller (closely held)

firms it is more expensive to raise equity than debt.
may be

due to a

number of reasons,

one of which

This

may be:

lesser access of smaller firms to capital markets than larg
er firms.

Since the study does not account for the differ—

ence in costs of raising debt and equity, the negative rela
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tionship

between

leverage

and insider

ownership

may

be

stronger than indicated by the regression. 17
Overall,

the

significant as
conclusion is

results of the

the dividend
that dividends

signals than leverage.

leverage ratio are

ratio results.
are used

not as

One possible

more frequently

as

This is contrary to what is hypoth

esized by Sarig (1984).

5.3

INDUSTRY EFFECTS ON REGRESSIONS
In order to

determine the influence of

on the regression

analysis,

industry factors

the data for all

the ten industry groups are pooled together.
firms are

in the

sample for

the payout

firms for the leverage analysis.

the firms in
A total of 523

analysis and

715

The results of the analy

ses for leverage and payout ratio are presented in Table 5.7
A zero-one

dummy variable is introduced

as an industry

dummy, thus a total of nine dummy variables are added to the
regressions.

The industry with a

mean payout and leverage

ratio closest to the aggregate mean is the excluded set.

17

When the sales variable is introduced in the regressions
the signs of the coefficients are reversed, probably due
to the multi-collinearity problem.
Thus in the leverage
analysis the results are more sensitive than in the div
idend analysis.
The regression results with the sales
variable are not reported.

TABLE 5.7
Results of Least Squares Regression for Payout
and Leverage Ratios Uith Industry Duomys

Payout
With Industry Without Ind.

Firms
Constant

XInsid

Noinsid

Stdev

Dummy

Dummy

523

523

715

715

0. 195
(4.26)
(.001>

0.318
(7.62)
(.001)

0.341
(7.88)
(.001)

0.302
(11.54)
(.001)

-0.002
(-5.17)
(.001)

-0.005
(-10.77)
(.001)

-0.001
(-1.99)
(.047)

0.088
(5.97)
(.001)

0.041
(4. 15)
(.001)

0.041
(3.90)
(.001)

0.001
(0.64)
(.520)

0.001
(0.65)
(.512)

0.091
(7.57)
(.001)

-0.002
(-1.04)
(.297)

-—

•

f

Sgroth

R Square
F Statistic
(P Value)

0.004
(0.41)
(.652)

0.025
(2.24)
(.025)

-0.001
(-3.62)
(.001)

-0.001
(-6.41)
(.001)

-0.002
(-4.68)
(.001)

———

-0.008
(-2.90)
(.004)
-0.040
(-0.45)
(.654)

DFL

Without Ind.

Dummy

RAD

Depr

Uith Industry

Dummy

1

DOL

Leverage

0.208
(6.39)
(.001)
—

-0.282
(-3.03)
(.003)
0.296
(9.26)
(.001)

...

...

0.55

0.30

0.31

0.15

48.06
(.001)

45.48
(.001)

23.92
(.001)

26.50
(.001)

Seven of the nine industry dummy variable coefficients are significant
at the .01 level for the dividend analysis.
Eight of the nine industry dummy variable coefficients are significant
at, "the .01 level for the leverage analysis.

72

For both the payout and leverage ratios a significant in
crease in the

explanatory power of the

models is observed.

The R square for the payout ratio increased by 0.25 and that
for the leverage ratio increased

0.16.

This is consistent

with the results of other studies such as the Bradley,
rell,

and Kim (1984)

study.

Jar—

This suggests that industry

factors are significant in explaining the variations in lev
erage and payouts across firms.

However, a significant poi—

tion of the variability remains

unexplained and is probably

due to the decisions of individual managers at the firm lev
el.

It should be noted that both the percentage of insider

ownership and number of insiders continue to remain signifi
cant, with the hypothesized sign.

5.4

STABILITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP OVER TIME

Since the data

used in the study is

cross-sectional in na

ture and insider ownership data for 1981 are available,
cross-sectional regressions were checked
time.

tapes.

for stability over

Because the 1981 Disclosure tape does not report div

idends
data

the

and

stock prices

from the

it is

Compustat tapes

necessary to
by matching

obtain these

firms on

both

In order to be consistent in the analysis, firms for

1984 are also matched.

The

the aggregate data for payout

results of the regressions for
and leverage ratios over both

years are presented in Tables 5.8 and Table 5.9 .
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TABLE 5.8
Results of the Least Squares Regression:
Dependent Variable Payout Ratio - 1984
(T Statistics and P Values in Parenthesis)
(-)

Industry

N

(+)

Constant XInsid Nolnsid

Aggregate
Data
1487 -0.962

-.002

.009

(-)

<-)

DOL

DFL

-.004

(-)

Sgroth

-.002

<+)

Sales

-0.002

R

F

Square

Value

0.27

90.05

.072

(-11.27) (-5.39) (1.11) (-4.60)(-0.32) (-3.91) (15.62)
(.001)

(.001) (.267)

(.001) (.749) (.001) (.001)

(.001)

Dependent Variable Payout Ratio - 1981
(T Statistics and P Values in Parenthesis)
(->

Industry

N

(+)

Constant XInsid Nolnsid

(->

DOL

(-)

DFL

(-)

Sgroth

(+>

Sales

R
Square

Aggregate
Data
1242-0.623

-.002

.011

-.053

-.002

-0.002

.058

0.21

F
Value

55.18#

(-6.59) (-5.38) (1.09) (-1.36X-2.37) (—3.01)( 1 1 .36)
t.WO

X.UUT) (.274)

(.169) (.DIB)

(.DU3) (.DDT)

(.DDI)
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TABLE 5.9
Results of the Least Squares Regression:
Dependent Variable Leverage Ratio - 1984
(T Statistics and P Values in Parenthesis)
(-)

Industry

N

Aggregate
Data
1487

Constant

0.475
(23.92)
(.001)

SInsid

-.001

(+)

Nolnsid

-.001

(-2.39) (-0.048)
(.017)

(.962)

(+)

(-)

(+)

Stddev

RAD

Depr

.001

-2.263

1.237

(3.50) (-11.19)

(5.50)

(.001)

(.001)

(.001)

R

F

Square

Value

0.09

31.61

(.001)

Dependent Variable Leverage Ratio - 1981
(T Statistics and P Values in Parenthesis)
(-)

Industry

N

Aggregate
Data
1242

Constant

0.528
(22.69)
(.001)

XInsid

-.001

(+)

Nolnsid

-.007

(+)

Stddev

(-)

(+)

RAD

Depr

-.001

-2.401

1.126

(-2.52) (-0.92)

(-0.20)

(-9.41)

(3.83)

(.012)

(.843)

(.001)

(.001)

(.360)

R

F

Square

Value

0.08

20.66

(.001)
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A total of 1242 firms matched for 1981 and 1487 for 1984.
The mean payout and debt ratios for 1981 are 0.289 and 0.308
respectively, while those for 1984 are 0.273 and 0.293.
results for

the payout

over the period.
ficient is
sign.

ratio show

a remarkable

The

stability

The percentage of insider ownership coef

significant for

The number of

is not significant.

both years

and has

a negative

insiders coefficient though positive,
This is

probably because the data in

cludes only NYSE and AMEX firms, which may not have as large
a variation

in the number of

insiders as 0TC

firms.

signs across the other variables are also consistent.
ever all the

variables are not significant.

for the 1984 data is a little

The
How

The R square

better than that for the 1981

data.
The results for the leverage ratio also show a stable re
lationship over time.
ship is negatively
cant

at the

significant.

Again

the percentage insider ownet—

related to the leverage

.02 level.

The

insiders is

not

The standard deviation variable, however, does

not show a stable relationship.
and significant for
for 1981.

number of

and is signifi

The

The coefficient is positive

1984 but is negative

R squares are similar,

and insignificant

with

the model for

1984 having a slightly better fit than the 1981 model.
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5.5

SIGNALLING VS THE RISK AVERSION HYPOTHESIS

One implication

of leverage

being used

firm value is that closely held
age than widely held firms.
er the

lower leverage

risk aversion on
owner—manager has

signal of

firms will have less levei—

However, it is not clear wheth

is due to

the signalling

motive or

the part of the

ownei—manager.

Since an

a significant portion

vested in a single firm,

the

of his

wealth in

manager may have an incentive

to decrease the riskiness of the
age.

as a

firm by using lower level—

Thus, whether the lower leverage is due to signalling

or a risk aversion motive is an empirical issue.
In order to investigate this further, the percent insider
ownership is

regressed against the systematic

tematic risk of

the firm to evaluate

and non-sys

the relationship.

A

negative relationship between insider ownership and non-sys
tematic risk would be consistent with a risk aversion motive
for low levels
plies

that a

of leverage.
manager

with a

The risk

aversion motive im

significant

portion of

his

wealth in a single firm and under—diversificaton of personal
wealth

will,

due to risk aversion on his part,

make deci

sions that diversify the firm and lower non-systematic risk.
To evaluate
Cusip numbers

the systematic and nonsystematic
for firms from

those on the CRSP tapes.

Disclosure were

risk,

the

matched with

A total of 1082 firms matched, 265
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firms from "the AMEX and 817
monthly
(beta)

tapes were

firms from the NYSE.

used to

compute

The CRSP

firm systematic

risk

and non-systematic risk using 72 months of data from

December, 1978 to December, 1984.

To estimate the systemat

ic and non-systematic risk of the firm,

a single index mat—

ket model .is used:

Rj

=

Rk

+

Rj
RK

is the return for firm j,
is the return for the CRSP equal weighted
market index,
is Cov (RJ , R K )/ Var ( R r) ,
is E(RJ) E(R K ), and
is the error term for firm j.

where:

/3j
aj
6j

The non-systematic risk of the firm is estimated from the
variance of the error term.
ship from

Disclosure

is

The percentage insider ownei—

regressed on

non-systematic risk of the firm.
the market value of equity is
adjust for

size.

from the CRSP

The market

the systematic

and

The natural logarithm of

included in the regression to
value of equity

daily files. 18 The results

is obtained

of the regression

are presented in Table 5.10 .

18

Three different measures for the market value of equity
for the firm were used: (a) average market value over the
six year period, (b) market value on December 31, 1984,
and (c) market value on December 31, 1981.
The results
are virtually the same using any of the measures.
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TABLE 5.10
Results of Regression of Ownership on Risk
0

=

<*i

+

SRisk + |32 NRisk + 0 3 Size + e

(T Statistics and P Values in Parentheses)
N

1082

<*1

/Si

12.623 -1.387
(11.80) (-3.82)
(.0001) (.0001)

@z

138.169
(6.35)
(.0001)

03

R
Square

F
Value

-0.825
20.249 92.45
(-10.53)
(.0001)
(.0001)

where:
0
SRisk
NRisk
Size

is
is
is
is
of
a1
is
01 , /3Z,
€
is

the percent insider ownership,
the systematic risk of the firm,
the non-systematic risk of the firm,
the natural logarithm of the market value
equity of the firm,
the intercept term,
03, are the regression coefficients, and
the error term.
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The results, show a negative relationship
ship and systematic risk (beta).

between ownei—

This tends to confirm the

earlier finding of a negative relationship between ownership
and leverage (since leverage and
lated,

see Hamada

significantly

(1972)).

beta are positively corre

The surprising result

positive relationship

is the

between ownership

and

the non-systematic risk of the firm.

This finding tends to

reject the risk aversion hypothesis,

as insiders choose to

own stock in firms that are
systematic risk).
to favor

Thus,

not well diversified (high non-

evidence from this analysis tends

the signalling hypothesis

over the

risk aversion

hypothesis.

5.6

THE SUBSTITUTE SIGNAL HYPOTHESIS

Sarig (1985) hypothesizes that leverage and dividends may
be used

as substitute

Scott (1985)
sis.

provide

signals of

firm value.

Sarig and

preliminary evidence for the hypothe

They find a significantly positive correlation between

leverage

and payout

for an

aggregate sample

of 894

NYSE

firms.
To investigate the issue further,

a correlation analysis

for 1771 NYSE, AMEX, and OTC firms is performed.
is then

disaggregated into industries

reported in Table 5.11 .

and the

The sample
results are
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TABLE 5.11

Correlation Analysis of Payout and Leverage Ratios

Industry

N

Means
Payout
Ratio

Aggregate Data

1771

0.260

Leverage
Ratio
0. 194

Correlation
CP value in
parenthesis)
0. 136

(0.0001)
Crude Petroleum
& Natural Gas

43

0.267

0.281

0.129
(0.4114)

Printing and
Publishing

41

0.278

0. 117

-0.568

(0.0001)
Electronic
Computing Equip.

42

0.030

0.064

0.004
(0.9803)

Radio & TV
Equipment

35

0.155

0.089

-0.128
(0.4629)

Measuring &
Control Instr.

26

0.126

0.098

0. 141
(0.4914)

Surgical &
Med Supplies

14

0.146

0.111

0.676
(0.0079)

Electric Services 75

0.645

0.469

-0.415
(0.0002)

Eating & Drinking
Places
22

0.106

0.219

0.051
(0.8209)

National Banks

77

0.354

0. 152

0.265
(0.0197)

Computer Data
Processing

37

0.050

0.099

-0.159
(0.3469)
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The correlation for the aggregate
significant at the .0001 level.

sample is 0.136 and is

However,

when the data is

disaggregated, four of the ten industries have negative coi—
relations,

two of which are significant at the .0002 level.

Unlike the results of Sarig and Scott (1985),

these results

suggest that

be substitute

dividends and leverage

may not

signals in these industries.
Further, Sarig (1985)

hypothesizes that leverage is ini

tially is used by firms for signalling, since it is non-dissipative.
firm,

When the use of

leverage becomes costly for the

dividends will be used as a substitute signal.

dence in this

study appears to contradict

Evi

this hypothesis.

However, evidence presented in this study is preliminary and
further research is needed in the substitute signalling area
to determine

exactly why differences in

between industries.

correlations exist

Chapter VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
This study is motivated by

the need to provide empirical

evidence for dividend payout and financial leverage signall
ing

equilibria

framework.

in

The

the

informational

hypotheses,

developed

asymmetry
in the

(agency)

signalling

equilibria framework,

suggest that closely held firms (with

high insider control)

should have

lower leverage and divi

dend payouts.
A cross-sectional analysis of
and leverage is performed with
explanatory variables.

the determinants of payout

insider control variables as

Both ownership control measures: (1)

percentage of insider ownership and (2) the number of insid
ers,

are found to be

significantly related to the dividend

payout and leverage ratios.
ership is

The percentage of insider own

negatively related to

payout and

leverage while

the number of insiders has a positive relationship.

This is

consistent with the dividend and leverage signalling hypoth
eses developed in
both dividends

the study.

The evidence

and leverage are

used as

indicates that

signalling mecha

nisms.

This provides

the most significant finding

study.

The results contradict the Sarig (1985)

- 82 -

of the

hypothesis
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that leverage
firm value,

and dividends

may be

although further study

substitute signals

of

is needed in this area.

A comparison of the results for 1981 and 1984 indicates that
the relationships are stable over time and are fairly robust
to violations in the regression assumptions.
The evidence presented in this study is supportive of the
Miller and

Rock C1984)

prediction that

the payout

ratio

should be an increasing function of the shares held by "out
side" investors.
indicate that
related.

The

The correlation and

regression analysis

insider ownership and payouts
relationships are

are negatively

significant at

the 0.001

level.
The study also
(1984)

provides support of the

observation that

a

Myers and Majluf

reduced information

asymmetry

should result in a lower leverage ratio of a firm as it will
prefer to

raise external

that leverage

funds through

and insider ownership are

equity.

Evidence

negatively related

supports this hypothesis.
Evidence for the utility industry
hypothesis of

Asquith and Mullins

Korwar (1986).

(1986)

and

They argue that information

tween managers and
try,

is consistent with the

outsiders is less in

Masulis and
asymmetry be

the utility indus

due to the regulation process and thus the lack of mo

tivation to signal.

Regression

analysis of payout ratios,
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for the utility industry,

fails

to detect a negative rela

tionship between dividends and ownership.
The hypothesis that closely held

firms should have lower

leverage is a joint test of the signalling and risk aversion
explanations.

The cross-sectional

regression of ownership

on the firm's non-systematic risk provides evidence in favor
of the signalling hypothesis.

The negative relationship be

tween ownership and non-systematic risk of the firm tends to
reject the risk aversion hypothesis.
The primary weakness
the leverage ratio.

of the study is in

the results for

The explanatory power of the regression

for the aggregate data is

rather low,

though the variables

are significant at greater than the one percent level.

Some

of the industry regressions also have low explanatory power.
The lack of

explanatory power may due to

in the results

a bias introduced

because of the differential

debt over equity,

especially for

cost of raising

smaller firms.

The neg

ative bias would result in a much stronger relationship than
indicated by the regression results.
The strength of
hinges on

the results for the

the acceptance

that the

significantly alter the results.
ity problem,

size is not

leverage ratio also

"size effect"

does not

Due to the multicollineax—

included in the explanatory vari

ables for the leverage ratio analysis.
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To provide further evidence

for the relationship between

ownership and the leverage and payout ratios,
analysis using
formed.

the event

a time series

study methodology,

may be

pei—

Firms with change in ownership and the date of this

change in

ownership (from

versa) may be identified.
leverage ratios before
after the change.

closely to

widely held

or vice

Around this date, the payout and

the change may be

compared to those

A decrease (increase)

in insider owner—

ship resulting in an increased (decreased) payout and level—
age will

present further

evidence in favor

of the

use of

dividends and leverage as signals.
The evidence against the substitute signalling hypothesis
is preliminary and needs further investigation for an expla
nation of why dividends and
in some

leverage are positively related

industries and negatively

in others.

agency cost reduction mechanisms such
pensation schedule
An extension

of the

have not been
present study

Also other

as the manager's com

addressed in

this study.

may include

managerial

compensation to provide further evidence for the agency cost
/ signalling equilibrium.
The existence

of ownership clienteles is

another intei—

esting issue that may be addressed in future work.
tion of dividend
nificant

and leverage clienteles has

attention

in financial

literature;

The no

received sig
this

study
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raises the possibility of the
teles.

existence of ownership clien
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Appendix A
COMPARISON OF DISCLOSURE VS VALUE LINE DATA

A random sample of 99 firms was chosen for comparison.
firms are from apparel, retail stores, banking,

The

fast foods,

petroleum and gas industries.
34 firms have significantly different

data (above 5 percent

difference).
27 firms have approximate data

in the Value Line Investment

Survey.
Value Line data is from December, 1984 and January, 1985.
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Co. Name
ADAMS MILLIS CORP
ALEXANDER S INC
AMERADA HESS CORP
AMERICAN NATURAL RESOURCES CO
AMES DEPARTMENT STORES INC
ASHLAND OIL INC
ASSOCIATED DRY GOODS CORP
BANK OF BOSTON CORP
BANK OF NEW YORK CO INC
BANK OF VIRGINIA CO
BANKAMERICA CORP
BANKERS TRUST NEW YORK CORP
BARNETT BANKS OF FLORIDA INC
CARL KARCHER ENTERPRISES INC
CARSON PIRIE SCOTT & CO
CHARMING SHOPPES INC
CHEMICAL NEW YORK CORP
CHEVRON CORP
CHURCH S FRIED CHICKEN INC
CITICORP
CITIZENS & SOUTHERN CORP
CLUETT PEABODY & CO INC
COASTAL CORP
DAYTON HUDSON CORP
DIAMOND SHAMROCK CORP
DIVERSIFOODS INC
DOLLAR GENERAL CORP
DUNKIN DONUTS INC
EXXON CORP
FAMILY DOLLAR STORES INC
FARAH MANUFACTURING CO INC
FEDERATED DEPARTMENT STORES IN
FIDELCOR INC
FIRST UNION CORP
FLEET FINANCIAL GROUP INC
GAP STORES INC
HAMILTON OIL CORP
HARTMARX CORP
HORN & HARDART CO
HOUSTON NATURAL GAS CORP
INTERNORTH INC
IRVING BANK CORP
JAMESWAY CORP
K MART CORP
K N ENERGY INC
LEAR PETROLEUM CORP
LEVI STRAUSS & CO

Exchange Disclosure Value Line
NYS
NYS
NYS
OTH
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
OTH
NYS
OTH
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
OTH
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
OTH
OTH
OTH
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
OTH
OTH
NYS
NYS
OTH
NYS
AMS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS

81 .59
51 .89
,
18.44
0.35
5.62
2.44
5.53
0.72
0,.53
67.29
0,.66
6,.94
1 .44
,
54..50
5,.83
47,.49
3,.48
0,.33
36,.79
38,.70
18..65
12,.28
7,.82
4.,71
0.,48
17.,00
26.,23
24.,59
0., 17
40.,38
19., 66
0.,71
2.,44
5.,04
2.,86
76.,70
76.09
4.,54
28.,05
4.42
1 .,30
0.,03
16.90
0.,50
2.,82
14. 12
40.,42

38.0
39.4
18.0
1 .0
12.0
2.0
3,. 1
1 .0
,
0,.6
22.3
1 .0
,
2.0
1 .9
,
55,.0
4,.0
37,.0
1 .0
,
1 .0
.
16,.0
1 .0
,
3..8
1 .,0
8.,0
1 .,0
1 .,6
26.,0
45.,0
35.,0
1 .,0
41 .,0
37.,0
10.,0
2. 0
4.3
2.0
47.6
79.0
5.0
33.0
4.0
1 .0
1 .0
20.0
1 .0
2.0
1 1 .0
43.0
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Appendix A continued

Co. Name
LIMITED INC
LIZ CLAIBORNE INC
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER CORP
MARINE MIDLAND BANKS INC
MAY DEPARTMENT STORES CO
MCDONALD S CORP
MELLON BANK CORP
MIDCON CORP
MITCHELL ENERGY 8, DEVELOPMENT
MOBIL CORP
MURPHY OIL CORP
NCNB CORP
NORDSTROM INC
OCCIDENTAL PETROLEUM CORP
ONEOK INC
PACIFIC RESOURCES INC
PALM BEACH INC
PANHANDLE EASTERN CORP
PETRIE STORES CORP
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO
PHILLIPS VAN HEUSEN CORP
PIC N SAVE CORP
PIONEER CORP TEX
QUAKER STATE OIL REFINING CORP
RAINIER BANCORPORATION
RUSS TOGS INC
RUSSELL CORP
SABINE CORP
SEAGULL ENERGY CORP
SEARS ROEBUCK & CO
SECURITY PACIFIC CORP
SHONEY S INC
SONAT INC
SOUTHLAND ROYALTY CO
STERLING BANCORP NEW YORK
STOP & SHOP COS INC
SUN BANKS INC
SYMS CORP
TENNECO INC
TEXAS EASTERN CORP
TEXAS OIL & GAS CORP
TRANSCO ENERGY CO
TULTEX CORP

Exchange Disclosure Value Line
NYS
OTH
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
AMS
NYS
NYS
NYS
OTH
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
OTH
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
AMS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
OTH
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS

35,.85
51 .99
,
6,.69
51 .61
,
4,.35
26..36
9,.73
2..53
60,.22
0 .30
,
23..76
22..62
34..55
1 1 ..34
3.,35
54.,03
20.,07
2.. 16
60.,87
0.,57
5.,22
33.,23
2.,40
3.,46
6.,77
0.,00
62.,03
10.,58
43.,08
35.,92
0.,81
33.,86
0.,91
24.,86
15.,85
19., 1 1
3.,89
0.,05
0.,26
25.,92
4.,56
1 .,89
15.,93

42.0
31 .0
1 .0
51 .0
1 .0
1 1 .0
10.0
2.6
63,.0
1 .0
,
35,.0
22,.0
57,.0
3,.0
2..0
41 ..0
30,.0
1 .0
,
66..0
3..5
18.,0
20.,0
3., 6
2.,0
5.,0
20.,0
47..0
9..5
25.,0
20.,0
1 .,0
35.,0
1 .,0
19.,9
14.,0
20.,0
4.,4
82.,0
1 .,0
1 .,0
5,.0
2..0
12.,0

96

Appendix A

continued

Exchange Disclosure Value Line

Co. Name

UNITED JERSEY BANKS
UNITED VIRGINIA BANKSHARES INC
WACHOVIA CORP
WAL MART STORES INC
UARNACO INC
WELLS FARGO & CO
WENDY S INTERNATIONAL INC
ZAYRE CORP
ZIONS UTAH BANCORPORATION

NYS
OTH
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
NYS
OTH

3.00
2.76
0 . 66
41.67
5.67
2.92
17.29
1 1 . 00
3.55

5.,0
1.,5
1 .0
50.,0
3., 1
3.,0
14.,0
13.,0
17.,0

Mean

18.1973

16.9061

Standard Deviation

20.9424

19.6488

Appendix B

NORMALITY TESTS AND RESIDUAL PLOTS FOR PAYOUT DATA
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TABLE 1 B
Measure of Skewness, Kurtosia, and Normality for
Payout Ratio

Sample

N

Skewness Kurtosis
(P value) (P value)

Kolmogorov-Smirnov
D Statistic

Aggregate
Data
Without Transformation

1771

Natural Log Transformation
Square Root Transformation
Croup 1 - Widely Held
Group 2

719
706

0.7103
(.001)

-0.3401
(.002)

0.1623

0.4297

-0.8934
(.001)

0.1978

(.001)

-0.1518
(.005)

-1.4229

0.2312

0.2B63

-0.7954

0.1243

(.001)

(.001)
(.001)

0.0409

(.001)

0.0918
(.308)

0.1964

346

1.5746
(.001)

2.3995
(.001)

0.2869

1725

0.2096
(.001)

0.7691
(.057)

0.0827

Natural Log Transformation

0.5589
(.001)

0.1873
(.057)

0.0563

Square Root Transformation

-0.0049
(.468)

-0.3591
(.001)

0.0330

Group 3 - Closely Held
Residuals
Uithout Transformation

A value of 0 for skewness and kurtosis represents normality
For the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic all P values are significant
at the less than .01 level.
Group 1: below 10 percent insider ownership
Group 2: between 10 and 45 percent insider ownership
Croup 3: above 45 percent insider ownership
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FIGURE 1 B
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR %INSID
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FIGURE 3 B
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR DOL
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FIGURE 4 B
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR DFL
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FIGURE 5 B
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR SGROTH
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FIGURE 6 B
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR SALES
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FIGURE 7 B
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR PREDICTED VALUE
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Appendix C

NORMALITY TESTS AND RESIDUAL PLOTS FOR LEVERAGE DATA
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TABLE 1 C
Measure of Skewness, Kurtosis, and Normality for
Leverage Ratio

Sample

Skewness Kurtosis
(P Value) (P Value)

Kolmogorov-Smirnov
D Statistic

Aggregate
Data
Without Transformation

1771

(.001)

(.001)

1.1347

0.1610

Natural Log Transformation

0.8510
(.001)

-0.0049
(.484)

0.1409

Square Root Transformation

0.0689
(.119)

-0.9355
(.001)

0.0671

1.0776

0.0359
(.001)

0.1436

1.4933
(.001)

2.5058

0.1786

0.0344

-0.2862

(.001)

(.060)

1.1499
(.001)

(.001)

Croup 1 - Widely Held

719

Group 2

706

Croup 3 - Closely Held

346

1.1833

(.001)

(.001)
0.1576

Residuals
Uithout Transformation

1765

Natural Log Transformation
Square Root Transformation

1.4557

0.1023

0.8131
(.001)

0.2649

0.0921

0.0884
(.066)

-0.7067
(.001)

(.012)

0.0432

A value of 0 for skewness and kurtosis represents normality
For the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D statistic all P values are significant
at the .01 level.
Croup 1: below 10 percent insider ownership
Group 2: between 10 and 45 percent insider ownership
Group 3: above 45 percent insider ownership
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FIGURE 1 C
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR %INSID
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FIGURE 2 C
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR NOINSID
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FIGURE 3 C
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR STDDEV
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FIGURE 4 C
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR RAD
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RESIDUAL PLOT FOR DEPR
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FIGURE 6 C
RESIDUAL PLOT FOR PREDICTED VALUE
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Appendix D
COMPARATIVE STATIC RESULTS OF THE MODEL

- 1 1 4 -

1 15

D.1

FIRST AND SECOND DERIVATIVES OF THE TOTAL COST
The total cost function from the model is:

D+B

J

TC =

B
0CD+B-X)fCX)dX +

B

J

7(B-X)f(X)dX
X

+ &(a,A)

(1D)

The first derivatives are:

dTC

D+B

J

=

dB

,
3 (D+B-X)f(X)dX + 3(0)f(B+D)

B
-

3(D)f(B) + J

B

,
7 (B-X)f(X)dX

X
+ 7(0)f(B)
dTC

D+B
= J

dD

(3D)

B

dTC

dS
=

da

,
g (D+B-X)f(X)dX + 3(0)f CB+D) > 0

(2D)

> 0

(4D)

doc

Assuming
and

3(0)= 7(0) =0

(5D)

3'(•)»7 / (.)>0

(6D)

The equation 2D may be simplified to:

1 16

dTC

J

=

dB

D+B

.

0 (D+B-X)f(X)dX - /3(D)f(B)

B
B
+ f

,
y (B-X)f(X)dX

(7D)

X

Using change of variables in equation 7D:
let

Y = D + B - X

then

dY = - dX

Substituting in the first term of the equation:

- J

0

/

0 (Y ) f(D+B-Y)dY =

D

D

J

/

0 (Y)f(D+B-Y)dY

0
D

Note

£(D)= J

3 (Y)dY

so equation 7D may be written as:

0
dTC
dB

D ,
=|
3 (Y)[f(D+B-Y)-fCB)] dY
0

+ J

B
7

,
(B-X)f(X)dX

(3D)

X

If f(.) is increasing in the relevant range:
f(D+B-Y) ^ f(B)

for all Y £ D

Thus the term in the square
zero.

brackets is always greater than

This, with the assumption in 6D implies that the de

rivative is positive.
Hence the first derivatives are positive and:

1 17

dTC

dTC
,

dD

dS
,

and

dB

> 0

(9D)

da

The second deriatives are:

d z TC
dB 2

D ,
.
.
= 1 0 (Y)[f (D+B-Y)-f (B)] dY
0
B
+ Jr 7"(B-X)f(X)dX + y (O)f(B)
X

d z TC

= J

dD 2

D+B

„
j3 (D+B-X)f<X)dX + 3 CO)f(D+B) > 0

(10D)

(11D)

B

Equation 11D is greater than 0, from earlier assumptions.

d 2 TC

d2S
=

da 2

>0

(12D)

da 2

The relevant cross derivative is;

d 2 TC
>0
dadA

Again if f'(.) is increasing in the relevant range:
f '(D+B-Y) ^ f '(B) for all Y £ D

(13D)

1 18

The term in the square brackets

in equation 10D is positive

and:

d 2 TC

d 2 TC

d z TC
(14D)

dB2

D.2

'

dD2

da2

'

COMPARITIVE STATICS

For the

optimal solution

of the

maximization problem

the

following conditions must be satisfied:

dE

dV
_

dTC
_

dB

dB

dE

dV

=

o

(15D)

=

o

(16D)

dB
dTC
_

dD

dD

dE

dV

dD
dS
_

da

da

=

o

(17D)

da

Now dividing 17D by 15D, for equilibrium!

dS

dTC
/

da

dV
=

dB

dV
/

da

(18D)
dB

1 19

dV

dV

Assuming

/
da

=

K

dB

where K is a constant.

dS

Equation 18D may then be written as:

dTC
=

K

(19D)

da

dB

Taking a differential of both sides:

d2S

d2a
da

+

da 2

d 2 TC
dA =

K

dB

(20D)

dB 2

dadA

A marginal change in each,

holding the other constant will

yield:

d2S

da
=

d2S
/

da 2

dA

<

0

(21D)

dadA

and
dB

.

d2S

=
dA

d 2 TC
/

dadA

>

0

(22D)

dB 2

Thus a and B will move in opposite directions in response
to a change in the marginal cost.
be used to

show that a and

A similar derivation may

D also move in

opposite direc

tions in response to a change in marginal cost.
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